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1. Introduction
The Taipei Tianhou-gong 台北天后宮  is a temple in the Ximen district of Taipei dedicated to the
Fujianese sea goddess Mazu 媽祖 (alternatively known as Tianhou 天后 or Empress of Heaven). As
is  the  case  with  most  temples  found in  Taiwan,  the  Taipei  Tianhou-gong is  home to  a  whole
pantheon of Chinese deities with backgrounds in various Asian religious traditions. Particular to the
Taipei Tianhou-gong is the presence of Kōbō Daishi 弘法大師 (774-835), the founder of Japanese
Shingon Buddhism. The several images of him that can be found at the temple attest to its colonial
past.  Before  the  Taipei  Tianhou-gong  as  it  stands  today  was  constructed,  the  headquarters  of
Kōyasan Shingonshū 高野山真言宗 (a sect within Shingon Buddhism) in Taiwan, the Kōbō-ji 弘法
寺, was located there. Although seemingly nothing more than Kōbō-ji leftovers, the images of Kōbō
Daishi found at the Taipei Tianhou-gong are more than relics of the past. When paying respect to
the deities present at the temple, visitors are encouraged to burn incense in his honor. Since most of
them come to consult Mazu, Kōbō Daishi long played only a minor role at the site. This, however,
is currently changing. 
In the last few years, the Taipei Tianhou-gong has become an important place to Taiwanese
walkers of the Shikoku henro 遍路1 (a 1,200-kilometer-long Japanese pilgrimage circuit). Up to the
year 2010, barely any Taiwanese knew about the Shikoku  henro. Those interested in making the
journey had to rely on partial information available in Chinese on the internet. The few people who
did manage to complete to Shikoku henro returned to Taiwan to share their experiences on the web
and in various publications. It is hard to make an estimation of the number of Taiwanese people
who have since gone on the henro. Many rely on social media such as Facebook in order to obtain
up to date information about the trail and events related to the henro in Taiwan. As of May 22, 2017,
the biggest two groups on Facebook have 1,300 and 1,400 members – though the member base
probably knows a lot of overlap. Put into perspective: the biggest international Facebook group on
the henro, where information is exchanged in English, has only 600 members. 
Kōbō Daishi is a figure central to the  henro.  It is believed that pilgrims walk the  henro
spiritually accompanied by Kōbō Daishi himself, a phenomenon known in Japanese as dōgyō ninin
同行二人 .  Since completing the  henro is  physically and spiritually demanding,  many become
affected by a condition popularly known as shikokubyō 四国病, or Shikoku sickness. This condition
denotes the intense longing for, and nostalgia to, the island's pilgrimage circuit. 
Now that an increasing number of Taiwanese have a connection to Shikoku, more of them
are  becoming interested in  Taiwan's  colonial  past.  The Taipei  Tianhou-gong in particular  is  an
1 The word 'henro' both denotes the actual pilgrimage itself as well as pilgrims who walk it. 
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important site to these people as Kōbō Daishi forms an integral part of it. Taiwanese henro can visit
the Taipei Tianhou-gong in order to pay their respects to Kōbō Daishi before going to, or after
having returned from, Shikoku. In November of 2016, a Buddhist service lead by Japanese Shingon
priests was held there. It was organized by representatives of the Taiwanese henro community. That
the Taipei Tianhou-gong now caters to the needs and wishes of Taiwanese  henro is additionally
interesting when taking into account that the former Kōbō-ji was the starting point of a copy of the
Shikoku henro created by the Japanese during the colonial period. The Kōbō Daishi of the Kōbō-ji
has thus been given a second life at the Taipei Tianhou-gong as a beacon to departing and returning
pilgrims. 
In the final months of 2016, I was able to conduct fieldwork in Japan, where I walked parts
of the Shikoku henro, and Taiwan, where I visited sites affiliated with Shingon Buddhism during the
Japanese period. Although my initial goal was to carry out ethnographic research into the status of
Kōbō Daishi at the Taipei Tianhou-gong itself, the focus of my fieldwork shifted upon the discovery
that the site used to function as the starting point of the Taipei henro and is today reprising a similar
role with regard to the actual henro on Shikoku. I now started viewing the Taipei Tianhou-gong as a
place simultaneously offering services to those who come to consult Mazu and those who feel a
connection to Kōbō Daishi. The site is characterized by the interpenetration of two different folk
religious discourses, both of which have informed the site at varying intensities over the course of
the previous century, and today interlock. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to untangle and specify these two discourses and show how
they have, in the past, informed the site in turn, and how they, today, do so simultaneously. This
requires me to situate these discourses historically, and consider the various social, political and
cultural  circumstances  that  have  contributed  to  their  emergence.  Each  chapter  of  this  thesis
therefore proceeds in a similar fashion: after discussing the most important political developments
in any period related to either the Mazu cult or Shingon Buddhism, I zoom in to consider how these
developments affected the site under scrutiny. 
In order to achieve my primary aim, I make use of the place-based approach to pilgrimage
sites. This approach focuses on the identification of historical layers that intertwine at any given
site.  It  has  its  starting  point  in  the  idea  that  multiple  meanings  can  be  projected  on  any site
simultaneously by a whole range of people with different spiritual needs and wishes. In my analysis
of the Taipei Tianhou-gong, I will be explicating four historical layers. These are taken up in the
four chapters that follow the next one on methodology.
The chapter on methodology begins with a discussion of past and present approaches to the
study  of  pilgrimage.  Victor  Turner's  theory  of  communitas holds  that  upon  embarking  on  a
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pilgrimage, pilgrims temporarily leave behind their social roles and become part of a community of
equals.  John Eade and Michael  Sallnow have challenged the universality of  this  conception of
pilgrimage. They argue pilgrimage sites are contested, and reject the idea that there can be a single
official discourse fully determining the meaning of any site. The place-based approach has its roots
in Eade and Sallnow's ideas, but does not assume meaning to be necessarily contested. Instead,
multiple meanings can coincide at a single pilgrimage location. 
After this discussion of theoretical approaches to pilgrimage, I critically discuss two terms
essential to my purposes in this thesis, namely 'pilgrimage' and 'religion'. The problem with the
word 'pilgrimage' is that it calls to mind connotations absent in Chinese and Japanese equivalents of
the term. In order to meaningfully discuss the practice of pilgrimage in Japan and Taiwan in the
chapters that follow, it is necessary to introduce and elaborate these equivalents. The term 'religion'
is  plagued  by  all  kinds  of  suppositions  rooted  in  Christian  sensibilities.  Most  Taiwanese  and
Japanese do not feel the need to subscribe to a single religious creed – their worldview is rather
combinatory in nature. They moreover do not consider themselves necessarily engaged in religious
behavior whenever they visit a temple or shrine. The term religion is therefore only of importance
when discussing matters at the abstract level of government policy or academic theory, not when
analyzing the behavior of ordinary people. 
In chapter three, I take up the analysis of the first historical layer: Taiwan's pre-colonial
Mazu cult.  This chapter covers the period from the defeat of the Dutch by remnants of the Ming
dynasty in 1662 to the moment the Japanese arrived in 1895. The Taipei Tianhou-gong may have
the Kōbō-ji as its spatial predecessor, but its spiritual predecessor is a temple called the Xinxing-
gong 新興宮. This temple used to be located in the nearby Banka 艋舺 district of Taipei, but it was
destroyed by the Japanese in 1943. The icon of Mazu that can now be found on the altar of the
Taipei Tianhou-gong originates from the destroyed Xinxing-gong. In order to fully appreciate the
role this icon plays at  the Taipei Tianhou-gong, it is necessary to consider the history of Mazu
herself. Temples belonging to her cult are locked in battles for legitimacy, and construing the much
older Xinxing-gong as the spiritual predecessor of the Taipei Tianhou-gong should therefore be seen
as  a  strategy meant  to  convince  visitors  of  the  temple  of  the  efficacy  of  its  Mazu  icon.  The
construction of such historical narratives is directly tied to financial flows and vital to any temple's
continued success. 
Chapter  four  concerns  the  second  layer  as  it  was  constituted  by  adherents  of  Shingon
Buddhism, and takes us into the Japanese period (1895-1945).  The first  section of this  chapter
relates  the  religious  policies  that  the  new government  pursued.  Although the  Japanese  initially
adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards Taiwan's 'native' religions, they become more repressive as
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time went on. When the second war with China broke out in 1937, the Japanese began to more
intensively Japanize the inhabitants of the island in order to make sure that they would serve the
emperor, rather than defect to the enemy. It is in this period that Chinese cultural assets came to be
under threat, and against this background that the 1943 destruction of the Xinxing-gong can be
explained. In this chapter's second section, I show how Shingon Buddhism disseminated in Taiwan,
focusing primarily on Taipei. I here discuss the history of the Kōbō-ji, the Taipei henro, and several
other sites. In order to understand how ordinary Japanese inhabitants of Taiwan experienced this
copy of the Shikoku  henro,  in the third section, I turn to the explication of a personal account
written by a person who walked it. 
The fifth chapter considers how, as part of the third layer, the Kōbō-ji is appropriated by
followers of the destroyed Xinxing-gong in the years immediately following the war. I begin this
chapter by describing how religious policy changed under Taiwan's new rulers. In order to set up
the sixth chapter, I relate changes in religious and cultural policy up to the new millennium. The
period between 1945 and 1949 (the year the Nationalist government fled from the Mainland and
settled in Taiwan) is a particularly tumultuous one, and it is in 1948 that the former Kōbō-ji is
handed over to the followers of the Xinxing-gong. This handover is shrouded in controversy – those
of  the  Mazu cult  claimed  it  was  legit,  while  the  Zhongguo fojiaohui 中國佛教會  (Buddhist
Association of the Republic of China) argued that it was inappropriate for a Buddhist temple to be
given to a folk religious cult. 
In chapter six, I begin with a survey past the deities of the Taipei Tianhou-gong. Doing so
offers a means of comparing how Taiwanese visitors to the Taipei Tianhou-gong interact with the
statues of Kōbō Daishi that can be found at the site. I will argue that the status of Kōbō Daishi there
is somewhat ambiguous, as many visitors do not know who he is and are likely to regard him as yet
another deity in the Chinese pantheon of gods. However, with the recent popularity of the Shikoku
henro among  Taiwanese,  the  temple's  Shingon  Buddhist  heritage  is  in  the  process  of  being
reactivated.  Taiwanese  pilgrims  who  depart  to  and  return  from  Shikoku  may  visit  the  Taipei
Tianhou-gong in order  to pay their  respects  to  Kōbō Daishi.  I  discuss  how a Buddhist  service
recently held by Shingon priests at the Taipei Tianhou-gong was organized by representatives of the
Taiwanese  henro community. This particular event is exemplary of the way in which the various
historical layers informing the Taipei Tianhou-gong today interlock to produce what I describe as a
parallelism of discourses. 
In the conclusion, I summarize the main results, and consider future directions for research.
Some sites touched upon only briefly in this thesis, for example, themselves warrant more in-depth
scrutiny. The Taipei Tianhou-gong is but one site in Taiwan where heritage from the colonial period
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is being rediscovered and reactivated. The investigation undertaken in this thesis can moreover be
turned around to consider, not the role Kōbō Daishi plays in Taiwan, but the role Mazu plays in
Japan. 
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2. Methodology
This chapter begins with a critical discussion of two influential theories that shaped the study of
pilgrimage, namely Turner's theory of  communitas and Eade and Sallnow's contestation model. I
then discuss the merits of the place-based approach to pilgrimage as it has been applied to two sites
in Japan –  respectively Kumano and Mt. Konpira – by David Max Moerman and Sarah Thal. I end
the next section by arguing Rob Weller has done something similar in the case of the  Eighteen
Kings temple in northern Taiwan, and briefly summarize how I apply the place-based approach to
the case under scrutiny in this thesis. Section 2.2. delves into the problem of the word 'pilgrimage',
which is a generic term for a mode of travel that has multiple non-generic equivalents in Japanese
and Chinese, each carrying their own specific connotations. In section 2.3., I argue that we should
be careful when applying the word 'religion' to the East Asian case, especially when our object of
study is the common people. While the term has its uses to academics and policymakers, we should
be careful to needlessly describe ordinary visitors to temples as engaged in a form of religious
behavior. In section 2.4., I consider a few cultural presuppositions about sacred travel that both the
Japanese and the Taiwanese share. 
2.1. The place-based approach
Turner's  work is  generally considered pioneering in  the academic study of pilgrimage.  He is  a
typical product of his era, the seventies, in which anthropologists were searching for the structural
characteristics of pilgrimage, that is to say, a set of formal qualities that would apply to pilgrimage
across cultures. Turner analyzes pilgrimage as though it were an extended rite de passage. A pilgrim
is someone who leaves behind his or her daily social  role and corresponding status in order to
become a part of an idealistic community of equals. The pilgrim thus finds himself in a kind of
social limbo, a condition to which Turner refers with the term 'liminality'. It is this state of liminality
that allows for communitas: the opportunity for pilgrims to socialize with each other without being
defined by previously established social roles and hierarchies (Turner, 1973: 204). 
The  downside  of  the  Turnerian  approach  to  the  study of  East  Asian  pilgrimage  can  be
considered  by  scrutinizing  Hoshino  Eiki's  1997  article  Pilgrimage  and  Peregrination:
Contextualizing the Saikoku Junrei and the Shikoku Henro. The context alluded to in the title of this
article includes the practice of pilgrimage across a great many cultures. In his discussion, Hoshino
compares a number of Japanese pilgrimages with Christian, Islamic, and Hindu counterparts. For
example, Hoshino deploys the difference between the circuit-type and single-line type of Japanese
pilgrimage to argue that single-line pilgrimages outside of Japan are in many cases not truly single-
line, because even when one travels to Santiago de Compostela there are many sites one can visit
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along the way (1997: 278-279). Similarly, he notes how Asian pilgrimage in general tends towards
being circular, only to downplay the importance of this fact in the Japanese case by arguing that the
average henro does not experience his pilgrimage to be circular, at all (Ibid.: 286). 
Quite a few results obtained through Hoshino's approach are only valid within the Turnerian
paradigm,  that  is  to  say,  when  one  tacitly  assumes  that  pilgrimage is  a  universal  practice  one
encounters across a variety of differing cultures. Under this assumption, the Hajj to Mecca, the
Camino  to  Santiago  de  Compostela,  and  the  henro on  Shikoku  are  all  species  of  the  genus
'pilgrimage'.  This  leads  to  a  theoretical  framework  in  which  one  can  compare  the  world's
pilgrimages by considering structural similarities and differences. To those researchers operating
outside  of  this  paradigm  (for  example,  to  those  departing  from  a  place-based  approach),  the
typological and structural differences among the world's pilgrimages uncovered by Hoshino are too
restricted to the realm of the abstract and the arbitrary to be meaningful. The sites compared are
simply culturally too diverse, and his results become highly problematic in nature as soon as one
begins to question the validity of the idea of pilgrimage as a universal practice.
Although Hoshino's work makes it clear that Turner's ideas have found fertile ground even
in Japan, his acceptance of Turner's conceptual framework to explain the practice of pilgrimage in
no way warrants its universal validity and application. Henny van der Veere has objected that the
uncritical application of notions such as liminality and communitas to Japanese pilgrimage is not
without  danger  (2014:  261).  It  is  indeed unclear  how concepts developed through the study of
Christian pilgrimage can tell us anything about pilgrimage in Japan or Taiwan. 
Yoshida Teigo has argued that the driving force for many a Japanese pilgrim to undertake
pilgrimage has in many cases been practical, not idealistic. He shows how, during the Edo period,
poor farmers facing a failing harvest would travel to Shikoku to become pilgrims – in practice
meaning they went to beg for food.2 People could also go on a pilgrimage to any of the temples
belonging to the  henro order to hold a Buddhist service for recently deceased relatives (in which
case we are speaking of reijō mawari 霊場回り). To some villages in Ehime, a pilgrimage to one of
Shikoku's sacred places was a form of spiritual training (shūgyo 修行), a kind of rite de passage for
the young to pass to adulthood (Yoshida, 2007: 55-56). These concrete examples show that there are
certain ideas motivating Japanese people to go on a pilgrimage that are easily overlooked when
uncritically resorting to Turner's model. The farmer who traverses Shikoku as a pilgrim in order to
obtain food is certainly not motivated by the ideal of communitas. 
An alternative approach to pilgrimage was developed by Eade and Sallnow in the early
nineties. They argue, pace Turner, that pilgrimage does not belong to the realm of the idealistic, but
2 These are referred to as kojiki junrei 乞食巡礼 by Hoshino; see 1997: 275.
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rather that mundane conflicts  are played out using pilgrimage as a stage.  Instead of taking any
pilgrimage to be informed by only an official discourse, they see sites as potentially reflecting a
whole range of competing discourses. Turner's idea of pilgrimage as conducive to anti-structural
communitas is not an empirical description of how pilgrimage is supposed to function everywhere,
but simply one among many available discourses – or culturally determined ways of speaking –
about  pilgrimage (Eade and Sallnow, 1991:  5-16).  The whole idea of  'pilgrimage'  as  a  formal,
universal  structure  is  here  challenged –  what  requires  study is  the  way in  which  the  category
'pilgrimage' is itself historically and culturally determined. Doing so means the study of pilgrimage
is  slowly  but  surely  disentangled  from the  theological,  unmasking  the  idea  of  communitas as
quintessentially determined by Christian ideals. Room is thus made for a whole host of different –
that is to say non-religious – motivations for undertaking pilgrimage, including Yoshida's case of
the farmer who goes on a pilgrimage with no other goal than to beg for food. 
While Eade and Sallnow's model forms an attractive alternative to  Turner's,  it  has been
criticized by scholars such as Simon Coleman for placing too much emphasis on the contested
character of pilgrimage sites. Coleman's remarks are instructive in this regard: 
Just as the Turnerian argument about communitas was rejected by scholars who went looking for
it  and  could  not  find  it  in  any  way  that  they  found  ethnographically  convincing,  so  the
contestation paradigm could potentially be challenged by a simplistic reading that looks for it at a
given site and instead finds a predominance of apparent harmony. (Coleman, 2002: 359)
I, too, was confronted with the apparent harmony Coleman is writing of while engaged in fieldwork
at the Taipei Tianhou-gong. The two discourses that I take to inform the site and will discuss in the
coming  chapters  seemingly  do  not  compete,  but  rather  appear  to  run  parallel.  I  return  to  this
parallelism  of  discourses  in  chapter  six.  Here,  however,  it  is  important  to  note  that  I  do  not
understand  these  discourses  to  be  set  in  stone.  They determine  the  way in  which  individuals
experience any given site, but since individuals have their own motivations for paying visits to
temples and undertaking pilgrimages,  discourses are continually adapted to correspond to ever-
changing spiritual needs. 
With Eade and Sallnow, we have entered, to use Coleman's terms, the era of postmodern
fragmentation. Recent research on pilgrimage both in Japan and Taiwan no longer departs from the
application of universal theories to specific cases, but instead draws on a variety of conceptual tools
and research methods in order to focus on the analysis of specific sites and places that form the end-
goal or a stop on the pilgrimage under scrutiny. This place-based approach puts less emphasis on the
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ethnographic study of a pilgrim's journey, and more on studying the cultural, historical and political
factors that have contributed to the social construction of sacred sites. Let me here discuss three
studies that make use of the place-based approach to pilgrimage in more detail – the first two on
sites in Japan, and the third on a site in Taiwan.
Max Moerman,  in  his  2005 study  Locating  Paradise,  shows how the  study of  a  single
location, in his case the mountains of Kumano, can bring to the surface a layered complexity of
traditions that all contributed to the cultural construction of a landscape that even today does not fail
to exert a pull on the imagination of the average Japanese person. At Kumano, the real and the ideal
continue to coincide in a place that was at different points in time shaped through the projection of
various worldviews – Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike – onto the landscape. Even though these
worldviews were shared by large groups of people, the individuals making up these groups each had
their  own  specific  motivation  for  traveling  to  Kumano.  Following  Eade  and  Sallnow,  Max
Moerman  takes  pilgrimage  to  Kumano  to  have  been  a  practice  with  multiple  and  contested
meanings. Since so many different worldviews interlocked at Kumano, it is only natural that the
pilgrims traveling there did not constitute a single, heterogeneous community. Rather, throughout its
long history, Kumano meant a great many things to a wide range of people, from the priests and
nuns who ran its temple and shrines, to the pilgrims of all backgrounds and classes who traversed its
mountains in search of the positive effects contact with one of many ideal worlds was supposed to
yield. 
Sarah  Thal's  2005  work  Rearranging  the  Landscape  of  the  Gods:  The  Politics  of  a
Pilgrimage Site in Japan, 1573-1912 similarly inverts the relationship between universal theories
and specific places. Rather than descending from the universal to the particular, Thal departs from
the particular and considers how specific localized events relate to the bigger historical picture. She
carefully reconstructs the history of Shikoku's Mt. Konpira by studying the discursive changes that
ran parallel to shifts in political power, focusing on the changes over time in the use of the word
kami 神 (god). Before 1868, use of the word kami had largely been ambiguous – it could denote any
number of things, from an entire mountain, to a single rock, to both at the same time –, a situation
which  was  apparently  not  perceived  to  be  a  problem.  After  the  Meiji  restoration  and  the
establishment of the modern Japanese state, attempts were made by the political elite to end the
ambiguous status of kami. Newly introduced Western categorizations made it necessary to sharply
demarcate the various spiritual beings inhabiting Japan's ideal worlds. Buddha's came to be seen as
beings of foreign origin, while the kami were touted as entities native to Japan. Other beings such as
tengu  天狗  (long-nosed  flying  goblins)  were  delegated  to  the  category  of  meishin 迷信 ,  or
superstition. Western categories, as soon as they were applied to Japanese phenomena, ceased to be
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descriptive and rather began functioning as normative ideals. I will return to this problematic in my
discussion of the use of the term 'religion' in section 2.3. 
In the Taiwanese case, Rob Weller wrote extensively on the Eighteen Kings temple (located
at the northern tip of Taiwan), including in the 1994 article Capitalism, Community, and the Rise of
Amoral Cults in Taiwan. Although his work on the Eighteen Kings temple prefigures the place-
based approach by a decade and concerns a different country, I consider him to have had a similar
orientation as Max Moerman and Thal in the case of Japan. He shows in detail how the fate of a
specific  site  came  to  be  intertwined  with  changes  in  Taiwan's  national  economy.  Weller's
characterization of the Eighteen Kings temple as an 'amoral cult' is illustrative of the way in which
non-religious motivations play a decisive role in explaining the popularity of certain shrines in
Taiwan. It were in fact mostly people concerned with making money that flocked to the Eighteen
Kings temple. Until the early 1970s, the temple had only been a minor ghost shrine3 dedicated to
seventeen shipwrecked wealthy Chinese and a dog. This dog is considered to be the eighteenth king
because it  supposedly remained loyal  to  its  masters  until  the  very end.  Ghost  shrines  grew in
popularity when Taiwan's economic boom had an increasing amount of people bet their earnings in
lotteries.  To  win  these  lotteries,  people  tried  to  obtain  lucky  numbers  in  any  way  possible  –
requesting  ghosts  to  communicate  these  numbers  thus  became  a  popular  practice.  The  deities
inhabiting  the  regular  temples  were  considered  unwilling  to  listen  to  such  immoral  wishes.
Economic stagnation and government crackdowns on illegal lotteries eventually lead to the decline
in the number of visitors to ghost shrines. Today, the Eighteen Kings temple is only a shadow of its
former self. 
The place-based approach as presented here allows me make to make sense of the way in
which the Taipei Tianhou-gong serves as a crossroads of pilgrimage. Drawing inspiration from the
above-mentioned studies, I will analyze the various traditions that have shaped the Taipei Tianhou-
gong and its predecessor (the Kōbō-ji) in terms of alternating and ultimately interlocking layers.
The first layer is determined primarily by the Xinxing-gong, and must be situated against the history
of  Mazu  in  Taiwan.  The  second  layer  takes  definitive  shape  in  1910,  when  the  Kōbō-ji  is
constructed using money made available by Kōyasan's Kongōbu-ji  金剛峯寺 . I take this layer to
have lasted until 1945, when Japan loses Second World War and the Japanese priests working at the
Kōbō-ji are expatriated home. The third layer lasts until the end of the first decade of the new
millennium; during this period, the site is shaped primarily by the Mazu cult. In chapter six I will
3 Taiwanese people distinguish between yinmiao 陰廟 and yangmiao 陽廟, that is to say, between 'dark', yin, and 'light',
yang, temples or shrines. Ghost shrines are yinmiao and therefore thought of as places where one can have one's 
immoral wishes granted by ghosts (gui 鬼); yangmiao, on the other hand, or lofty places where the gods (shen 神) 
reside and where does not go to, for example, request money. 
10
argue that today, we are witnessing a transition to a fourth layer, in which the first, second and third
layer interpenetrate to produce a parallelism of discourses similar to the one Max Moerman has
identified at work in the mountains of Kumano. 
2.2. The term 'pilgrimage' and its Japanese and Taiwanese equivalents
To the Western mind, pilgrimage involves a journey, often long and arduous, to a religious location;
often, we take the journey to be more important than the goal, and see pilgrimage as an experience
aimed  at  self-transformation.  The  word  'pilgrimage'  therefore  has  an  ascetic  ring  to  it.  These
connotations may interfere with a correct understanding of the phenomenon of pilgrimage in the
cultures of East Asia. As Susan Naquin and Yu Chung-fang write in the introduction to their volume
on Chinese pilgrimage, Western scholars have had to '...shake off the influence of Western religions
– with their clear definitions of religion and believer, identifiable acts of worship, and assumption of
hardship as part of the pilgrimage journey' (1992: 3). In order not to force our definitions onto the
way in which Japanese and Taiwanese people experience and talk about the phenomenon we know
as 'pilgrimage', it is important to here consider the various Japanese and Mandarin equivalents of
the word. 
 In the Japanese case, the miniature pilgrimage circuits (utsushi reijō 写し霊場) that can be
found all over the country are a clear example of a form of pilgrimage to which none of the above-
mentioned connotations apply. The henro's many copies, however short, have the same function as
the actual route past eighty-eight sacred places on Shikoku itself: to allow pilgrims to enter an ideal
space from where they can accumulate merit (or  kudoku 功徳 , a term I discuss in more detail in
section 2.4.).  Japanese pilgrimage is thus not necessarily long. Nor does it have to be arduous;
thousands of Japanese complete the Shikoku henro each year by car, and an even larger number by
bus. It is moreover not uncommon for people to stay in luxurious hotels and guesthouses along the
way. 
A miniature copy of  the Shikoku  henro can still  be found in Taiwan at  the present-day
Qingxiu-yuan  慶修院  in Hualien,  originally a Shingon Buddhist  missionary post set  up in the
colonial period that has now been preserved as a tourist site. This particular miniature copy of the
Shikoku  henro can  be  performed  in  a  few  minutes,  but  may  take  longer  depending  on  the
inclinations of the visitor. To those Japanese living in Hualien during the colonial period (mostly
immigrants from Shikoku's Tokushima prefecture), performing this copy must have meant partaking
in a little piece of home. It is highly likely that the  utsushi reijō  of the Qingxiu-yuan was made
possible through the process of bunshin 分身, in which some ground is taken from a certain location
to another in order to allow for the transfer of the original location's perceived spiritual benefits.
11
During the colonial period, someone may have brought some ground from all of Shikoku's eighty-
eight temples to the Qingxiu-yuan in order to guarantee the efficacy of its miniature henro. 
Besides the word 'henro', another Japanese term corresponding to our word 'pilgrimage' is
junrei 巡礼, which refers to the idea of visiting multiple temples and performing rites there. If one
undertakes a journey with the goal in mind to only visit one temple, it is instead referred to as
sankei 参詣 (Yoshida, 2007: 49). Not only did Taiwan offer a copy of the eighty-eight sacred places
of Shikoku, it also had multiple copies of the thirty-three sacred places making up the Saikoku
junrei,  which is dedicated to  the bodhisattva Kannon  観音 .  Similar  to what happened at  Max
Moerman's  Kumano,  features  of  the  Taiwanese  landscape  were  taken  by  the  Japanese  to  be
indicators of sacred space. The Guanyin-shan 観音山 in Taipei, which featured its own copy of the
Saikoku junrei, is exemplary of such spatial projection. 
In Taiwan, the idea of pilgrimage has a strong communal ring to it. The generic term in
Mandarin for pilgrimage, chaosheng 朝聖, simply refers to the act of traveling to and visiting a
sacred site that is of importance to a certain individual. This term could therefore also be taken to
describe, for instance, the Hajj to Mecca. More specific to Chinese culture is the undertaking of
jinxiang 進香 , which generally involves group travel to multiple sacred sites in order to perform
baibai 拜拜 there. As Naquin and Yu mention, sacred sites are seen in Chinese popular religion as
places where people can share in ling 靈, or the manifest spiritual power of a deity. Jinxiang, then,
refers to bringing and burning incense in front of a deity in order to make contact with it (Naquin
and Yu, 1992: 11). 
The word 'baibai' is a more popular way of expressing the act of visiting a site's deities in
order to consult them, or make specific requests (usually related to overcoming personal hardship).
Temples help their visitors by putting up instructions on how to properly perform baibai, which is
different  in  every case.  The Taipei  Tianhou-gong,  too,  offers  such instructions.  These have the
visitor  go  past  all  of  its  main  images,  including  Kōbō Daishi,  in  order  to  offer  incense.  It  is
important to note here that most people who perform baibai are only interested in consulting one
deity in specific. They will greet and offer incense to other deities present at any given site, but
mostly do so out of respect. Baibai is often, but necessarily, accompanied by acts of divination that
are meant to elicit responses from the deities. In Taiwan, even a simple baibai to a temple can be
taken  to  be  an  act  of  pilgrimage.  The  image  of  hardship  that  sticks  to  the  Western  notion  of
'pilgrimage' is absent in most baibai behavior, which in many cases is also meant to be enjoyable. In
Taiwan, tourism and baibai to a temple often go hand-in-hand. As I argue in more detail in the next
section, it is partly for this reason that we should not consider it religious behavior by default.
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I  make use  of  the  Japanese  and Mandarin  equivalents  of  the  English word  'pilgrimage'
introduced above whenever possible in the coming chapters. Referring to the different modes of
travel these people regularly undertake with the term 'pilgrimage' in each and every case needlessly
invokes all kinds of out-of-place connotations that are best avoided if a correct understanding of the
subject at hand is to be obtained. 
2.3. The term 'religion'
As Robert Ford Campany argues in his 2003 article On The Very Idea of Religions, the application
of the thoroughly Western notion of 'religion' to Eastern religious traditions and practices is not
without a certain amount of danger. In the West, we tend to think of religious traditions as separate
entities – that is to say, as systematic, coherent and clearly demarcated wholes. The word 'religion'
is thus charged with certain presuppositions, meaning that there is nothing neutral about the term
(Campany, 2003: 289-291). We should be careful to uncritically assume the existence of sharply
demarcated  religious  traditions  when  studying  the  East  Asian  case.  What  we  call  'Daoism',
'Confucianism' and 'Buddhism' have come about through a long history of mutually implicative –
and by no means necessarily continuous – development; it is therefore unsure where one tradition
ends, and another one begins. It is furthermore dangerous to assume that the people whose behavior
we observe at temples and shrines subscribe to only a single one of these creeds. When visiting
sacred sites, they may in fact not even consider themselves to be engaged in religious behavior at
all. 
I have already briefly touched upon the problematic nature of the Japanese equivalent of the
Western category of religion, shūkyō, while discussing Thal's work in section 2.1. I there wrote that
the newly minted category shūkyō had normative implications resulting in a specific arrangement of
the Japanese religious landscape – an arrangement that certainly did not exist before. This also
affected the modernization of Taiwan and the way in which religious affairs on the island were run.
As I will show in more detail in section 3.2., the Mazu cult was at some point designated as a form
of  meishin (superstition)  that  needed to be combated in  favor of Shinto.  To make things  more
complicated, the Japanese themselves did not regard Shinto as a form of shūkyō, but rather took it to
be the expression of the Japanese spirit – if anything, Shinto was an ideology, not a religion. This is
the reason why Taiwanese students often made field trips to Shinto shrines. Such visits were not by
the Japanese themselves regarded as religious in nature, but meant to instill Japanese values in the
population. The use of the label 'religious' in this context is therefore also not without its problems. 
These issues, both with the present-day Western application of the word 'religion', and the
way in which the term shūkyō  was deployed by the Japanese from the Meiji period (1868-1912)
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onward, additionally reveal the merits of the place-based approach. As Barbara Ambros points out
in the introduction to  her  2008 book  Emplacing a Pilgrimage:  The  Ōyama Cult  and Regional
Religion in Early Modern Japan, the typically Western orientation towards doctrine and sectarian
affiliation creates a tension in the study of the Japanese worldview, since the latter is above all
combinatory in nature (i.e. taking its inspiration from and synthesizing many different traditions),
while  the  former  implies  the  constant  search  for  a  form  of  religiosity  that  can  be  taken  to
representative of a specific place or a given period in time. With so many different traditions acting
as cultural determinants, and with so many sites regularly changing sectarian affiliation throughout
history, it seems nearly impossible to clearly identify and demarcate the boundaries between the
various traditions informing specific places – and the question has rightly been posed by Ambros
why we should in the first place. She argues that it might be better to methodologically depart from
the idea that the Japanese worldview is combinatory in nature. 
The  term  'combinatory',  however,  is  still  not  entirely  appropriate  when  describing  the
Japanese  worldview.  It  suggests  that  there  are  a  number  of  elements  that  together  compose  a
complex whole of interpenetrating ideas, but precisely this is the kind of analytical view we need to
move away from. The Japanese worldview is best studied as a given – trying to isolate different
traditions means one is at risk of ending up with meaningless and artificial demarcations that do not
assist one in understanding the cultural presuppositions that determine the way in which Japanese
people experience a visit to a sacred site. 
What strikes me about the current literature on Taiwan is that the words 'religion' and its
supposed counterpart 'secularization' are invoked frequently, as if these are real oppositions, and as
if  these  are  actually  existing  entities.  While  this  opposition  may function  well  when  studying
phenomena at the societal level, I am unsure whether they are going to be useful when looking at
the level of the individual. In my fieldwork, I have found that many of the people I interviewed did
not feel as if visiting a temple to perform baibai was an act of religious behavior. Instead, I found
that many do baibai for psychological reasons, and believe others to do so as well. Speaking with a
deity and consulting a fortune teller can have a strong therapeutic effect. Many Taiwanese do not
seem to subscribe a specific religious creed, but instead feel free to regularly visit  temples and
shrines of various backgrounds in order to see what services are on offer. Describing these people as
'secularized' misses the point completely: they never considered themselves religious to begin with. 
Yet another paradigmatic distinction that I find problematic in the case of the literature on
Taiwan is C. K. Yang's between diffused and institutional religion. The latter term is used by Yang
to describe the kind of religion that has been embodied by independent social institutions, while the
former refers to the kind of religion that exists primarily in the minds and hearts of the people and
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does not need rely on separate institutions for its propagation. Since it has not been systematized,
diffuse religion can affect the workings of even those institutions we would consider secularized.
Yang goes on to defend that in the Chinese case, diffuse religion has always been more prominent
than institutional religion (Yang, 1961: 294-340). 
The problem I have with this distinction is that it turns the term 'religion' into one that can be
applied across societies, as if it were simply a neutral, purely analytical term. Yang himself admits
of  the  universal  nature  of  religion  when  he  writes  that  '...religion  in  any  form  stems  from
psychological sources which are independent of the structure of secular life' (Ibid.: 295). While it is
true that there is little institutionalized about the average baibai to a site belonging to the Mazu cult,
I am apprehensive about immediately referring such an act to the category of diffuse religion. Our
theoretical model needs to have room for the possibility that baibai is not necessarily religious at
all. 
In the concrete example of the Taipei Tianhou-gong, we quickly see how application of the
category 'religion' needlessly induces all kinds of problems. To the informed Western observer, it
may seem rather strange that  Kōbō Daishi, supposedly belonging to the Shingon sect of Japanese
Buddhism, shares the same sacred space as Mazu, who is taken to belong to popular Chinese folk
religion. However, to the Taiwanese or Japanese visitor, who do not think along the lines of such
sharply defined categories, nothing is thought to be out of place at all. If a Japanese visitor to the
Taipei Tianhou-gong is confused, it is rather because he or she is unfamiliar with Taiwanese ritual
practice – not because the combination of Kōbō Daishi and Mazu is felt to be strange. 
When I interviewed one Japanese priest, who has been involved with performing Shingon
ceremonies  at  the  Taipei  Tianhou-gong  and  other  Taiwanese  temples  affiliated  with  Shingon
Buddhism for a couple of years now, and asked him whether he finds it odd to perform services
with an image of Kōbō Daishi standing on a central altar in front of an icon of Mazu, he replied that
he does not find it to be strange at all, and remarked that Japanese Buddhist priests also have no
problem celebrating  Christmas.  Similarly,  a  Taiwanese  person  performing  baibai at  the  Taipei
Tianhou-gong with a specific spiritual or psychological need in mind will simply go to the deity
they believe can help them with their problems. Discussions on whether Guanyin is a Daoist or a
Buddhist deity do not typically interest them. Nor do they particularly care about who Kōbō Daishi
is – they will treat him as though he were just another obscure deity, possibly not even realizing he
is Japanese. 
This is not to deny that there is such a thing as institutionalized religion. I also do not deny
that the term 'religion' forms a useful analytical category at the academic level. My only point of
concern is that the regular people frequenting temples do not operate according to the lines laid out
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by academics and policymakers. If Japanese and Taiwanese people rarely describe themselves as
'religious', then we should not needlessly regard their visits to temples and shrines as religious acts.
More often than not visits to sacred sites are simply part of touristic outings with no intention of
engaging in what  we would describe as  religious behavior  whatsoever.  That  the way in which
temples and shrines are experienced is – consciously or unconsciously – determined by established
cultural patterns does not mean people cannot have their own motivations for visiting them, or that
such patterns are necessarily informed by specific religious traditions and their doctrines. 
2.4. Shared ideas on sacred travel
That the Shikoku henro is becoming popular among Taiwanese means that the practice of Japanese
pilgrimage must appeal to them. In the case of walkers originating from the West, it is easy to see
that certain preconceptions regarding Buddhism overwhelmingly determine the way in which the
pilgrimage is experienced. If we take pilgrimage to revolve around the ideal of ascetic practice, then
it is not to hard to understand how the Shikoku henro, because of its great length and many physical
challenges, can resonate with so many people in the West. There are plenty of reasons, however, to
assume that both Taiwanese and Japanese henro are motivated by different ideas regarding sacred
travel and its purpose. In this section, I take up three such ideas that I consider the Japanese and the
Taiwanese to share: first,  the modes of sacred travel known as  jinxiang and  junrei;  second, the
concept of ling or rei 霊; and third, the notions gongde 功德 and kudoku. 
The Taiwanese practice of  jinxiang displays strong similarities with the manner of travel
known by the Japanese as  henro and  junrei.  To be sure, I here by no means intend to say that
jinxiang,  henro and  junrei are  all  species  of  the  (universal)  genus  'pilgrimage'.  The  structural
similarities referred to here are the result of shared cultural values finding a similar expression in
certain forms of sacred travel. The idea of following a set path at any given temple or shrine in
order to pay a visit to a site's most important deities (the idea of baibai in Taiwan or junpai 巡拝 in
Japan) is also present in both cultures, as is the belief that traveling to a sacred site enables one to
share in the spiritual power of a deity thought to be emanating from an ideal other-world (a power
known as rei in Japanese or ling in Mandarin). In fact, as I briefly noted in section 2.1., the practice
of visiting temples belonging to the Shikoku henro can also be referred to as reijō mawari, literally
meaning  'going  around  places  where  spiritual  power  is  present'.  It  is  no  surprise,  then,  that
Taiwanese will feel somewhat at home walking the Shikoku henro. 
That Taiwanese and Japanese can so easily make sense of each others' way of experiencing
travel to sacred sites is perhaps mainly the result of a shared history. Sixty years of colonial rule left
its mark on the post-war development of Taiwanese culture. Priests from various sects of Japanese
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Buddism arrived in Taiwan almost immediately after it had been ceded to Japan through the Treaty
of Shimonoseki of 1895. Their first priority was to set up missionary posts, fukyōjo 布教所 , from
where missionary work could be coordinated (Lin, 2012: 26). Japanese Buddhism was thus present
in Taiwan during the entire colonial period, leaving its mark on the generation of priests and nuns
that would step into the spiritual vacuum left behind by the Japanese upon their departure.
In the past few decades, the this-worldly character of Japanese Buddhism has come to the
attention  of  cultural  anthropologists  and  scholars  of  religion.  In  their  1998  book  Practically
Religious: Wordly Benefits and the Common Religion of Japan, Ian Reader and George J. Tanabe
argue that Japanese people are generally concerned with the extent to which certain ritual acts can
provide  genze riyaku 現世利益 , that is to say, concrete practical benefits (such as good health,
professional  success,  and  a  sense  of  personal  well-being)  in  this  world  rather  than  the  next.
Moreover, as Van der Veere argues, the attraction that sacred places exert upon Japanese people
does not only owe to their perceived status as heterotopia (ideal other-places that actually exist as
utopia,  a notion to which I  return in section  4.3.),  but  also hinges on the Buddhist  concept of
kudoku, or merit (2014: 266). The acquisition of kudoku is thought to be inexorably linked to the
kinds of  genze riyaku just mentioned. Pilgrimages in Japan, then, can be considered to be travel
circuits set up to enable the acquisition of significant amounts of kudoku. 
The this-worldly character of Japanese Buddhism influenced the development of post-war
Buddhist  organizations  that  focus  on  social  work  and  community  service  rather  than  only  on
monastic life – organizations that have a great number of volunteers working for them, and that
exert considerable influence on present-day Taiwanese society (Madsen, 2008: 320-321). The most
influential of these is called the Buddhist Compassionate Relief Association, or Ciji Gongde-hui 慈
濟功德會, which has the Mandarin equivalent of kudoku, gongde, in its name and was established in
1966 by Buddhist  nun Zhengyan Fashi  證嚴法師 .  This  organization  focuses  on  this-worldly
activities such as charity and education; local branches raise money which is then used to aid people
in need in the immediate vicinity. They furthermore operate three hospitals in Taiwan (Ibid.: 298-
300). 
That the Taiwanese are no strangers to  kudoku and  genze riyaku is readily apparent when
paying a visit to any temple regardless of denomination. People can donate money into so-called
gongde-xiang 功德箱 , boxes that can be found in almost every temple and into which one is also
often expected to put one's money when buying temple merchandise. Exchanging money for goods
and services in this manner is seen as a transaction with the other-world, where the gods and one's
ancestors are taken to reside. Similar to Japan, people can buy books that can be used for copying
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Buddhist sutra's, which is linked to the acquisition of gongde. Instructions in such books sometimes
make explicit  mention of that fact  that  accumulated  gongde can be transferred to relatives  and
friends, which is also possible with its Japanese equivalent (ekō 回向). The motivation for seeking
out contact with the ideal world is thus not necessarily ascetic or aimed at personal transformation,
as  the  Western  person would  be  inclined  to  think,  but  can  also  be  aimed at  obtaining  certain
practical benefits for oneself or one's (deceased) relatives through the accumulation of gongde. 
To sum up, what the Japanese and Taiwanese share is the expectation that the interaction
with places where rei or ling is palpable – by definition mysterious places such as temples – yields
certain  amounts  of  kudoku or  gongde,  the  acquisition  of  which  is  related  to  certain  practical
benefits, riyaku or liyi 利益, that one hopes to obtain. 
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3. The Ming and Qing dynasties
The Taipei Tianhou-gong does not have one, but two predecessors: a spatial, and a spiritual one. Its
spatial  predecessor is  the Kōbō-ji.  Its  spiritual  predecessor  is  the Xinxing-gong, a  temple once
located in the Banka district of Taipei, built in 1746 but demolished by the Japanese in 1943. The
Xinxing-gong's primary object of worship was a Mazu icon that is today the main image of the
Taipei Tianhou-gong. Since the Xinxing-gong prefigures the Taipei Tianhou-gong, dedicating this
small chapter to it is necessary in order to understand the site-specific developments detailed in the
chapters that follow. Moreover, the impact Japanese religious policy had on the Mazu cult can only
be  fully  appreciated  if  one  is  familiar  with  the  currency  of  its  spiritual  economy:  ling.  The
circulation of  ling goes hand in hand with the practice of cross-strait  jinxiang, which serves as a
means to recharge the power of Mazu icons. 
Section 3.1. aims to not only briefly sketch the dissemination of Mazu in Taiwan from the
final years of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) to the end of the rule of the Qing (in the Taiwanese
case in 1895), but to also show how Mazu temples in Taiwan are locked in a struggle over which
among them is the most legitimate descendant of the original temple. Possessing the icon of Mazu
with the oldest connection to the original temple means one is bound to receive a lot of visitors –
temples indeed depend on the belief in the efficacy of their icons for their survival. In order to
convince visitors that an icon is potent, temples engage in the construction of historical narratives
meant to prove old age and distant origin. In section 3.2., I briefly show how the Taipei Tianhou-
gong  has  similarly  constructed  a  historical  narrative  detailing  its  historical  connection  to  the
Xinxing-gong.
3.1. The history of Mazu
Speaking of  a  'Mazu cult'  makes  it  sound as  though we can  are  dealing  with a  homogeneous
community of people, but nothing could be further from the truth – and it is for this reason that the
exact history of Mazu so difficult to determine. Temples and their adherents are engaged in disputes
with other temples over who possesses the oldest Mazu icon, and these disputes are fought out
using history as the primary weapon. No single historical account of the origin of the Mazu cult in
Taiwan offered by any particular temple can therefore be taken at face value. To make things more
complicated, different temples lay stress on entirely different parts of the history of Mazu in Taiwan
in their battle for legitimacy. In his 1988 article History and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy: The Ma Tsu
Cult of Taiwan, Stephen Sangren identifies three kinds of historical arguments deployed by temples
and their enthusiasts in their struggle. 
The first way of establishing legitimacy is by claiming one's temple to have a branching
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relationship  with  Meizhou,  the  island  off  the  coast  of  China's  Fujian  province  where  Mazu
(originally named Lin Moniang) lived during the second half of the tenth century AD. There are
possibly as many variations on the myth of Mazu as there are temples. The story generally has it
that relatives of Mazu went out to sea one day and met with disaster; in attempting to save them
using certain supernatural powers, Mazu lost her life. After her untimely death, people began to
connect sightings of a girl roaming the oceans leading fishermen to safety to her activity. The myth
thus served to establish Mazu as a powerful figure with divine powers. Any time people went out to
sea, they would take an icon of Mazu with them for protection. In the case of shipwreck, sailors
would attribute their survival to the divine intervention of Mazu and build a shrine in her honor.
This is how she came to be one of the most important goddesses of the sea, and spread as far as
Japan.4 
The icons that sailors carried with them were the result of a ritual process called fenling 分
靈 .  This ritual allows one to transfer ling from one image of a deity to another. The temple in
possession of the oldest Mazu icon that is the result of fenling performed at the Meizhou temple can
thereby claim to be Taiwan's most original Mazu temple. Since old icons produced in far away
places are considered to be especially efficacious, people who want to perform baibai are drawn to
them. There are thus economic reasons to dispute another temple's claims to have the oldest Mazu
icon, as any plausible claim by a rival temple is likely to draw the crowds away. 
The second way of establishing legitimacy is by demonstrating one's Mazu temple to have
had the status of official temple during imperial times (that is, up to 1895). Many temples are in the
possession  of  plaques  either  bestowed to them by court  officials  (bianwen 匾文 )  or  even the
emperor himself (longbian 龍匾 ). Establishing one's temple to have been an official one during
imperial times is therefore relatively easy to prove. 
Local cults such as Mazu's on Meizhou were generally at odds with imperial ideology. This
tension was frequently resolved by having the emperor bestow titles on particular deities, whereby
they came to be officially recognized. They were consequently drawn into official ideology, and
thus came under a  certain extent of imperial control. This also happened in the case of Mazu (her
official name Tianhou, or Empress of Heaven, is the result of this custom). In official ideology, a
deity's power was not linked to its ling – ling was an autonomous power that fell outside the control
of the imperial court and was as such considered occult. Instead deities were dependent on their
rank within the heavenly imperial court for their power, and emperors could control this power by
promoting or demoting them. Although the Japanese would try to suppress the Mazu cult during the
4 See Nakamura, 1942. He reports that Mazu came to be called Tenpi 天妃 ('heavenly dame') in Japan. Not only did 
she spread to Okinawa and Nagasaki, but as far as present-day Ibaraki prefecture's Mito city. 
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later stages of their rule, it would be a mistake to assume that the Mazu cult had not met with
hardship during imperial times. Since official ideology and local beliefs often clashed, the Mazu
cult was at many points in its long history viewed with a certain degree hostility by those in power. 
Third, there are also temples which stress that they are descendants of the first Mazu temple
built by Koxinga (or Zheng Chenggong  鄭成功 ; 1624-1662). This general remained loyal to the
Ming dynasty after it had been overthrown by the Qing. He rebelled against the newly founded
Qing dynasty by using his sizable force to take Taiwan from the Dutch, establishing a court there in
the name of the Ming. The military victory of Koxinga against the Dutch in 1662 was attributed to
the divine power of Mazu. The image he enshrined on the beach where he landed with his troops is
therefore believed to  be especially efficacious,  and those who can legitimately claim to be the
successor of this temple are thought to share in its power.
These  three  arguments  used  by  temples  to  lay  claim  to  legitimacy  show  the  relative
complexity with  which  the  dissemination  of  Mazu took place  in  Taiwan.  The earliest  Chinese
settlers of Taiwan were people who crossed over from Fujian province in search of better fortune.
When they managed to survive the crossing, they built a small shrine dedicated to Mazu. In many
cases,  temples  claim to  have  been  founded  by people  that  accidentally  drifted  to  Taiwan  and
attributed their survival and the discovery of a new land to Mazu's spiritual direction. The shrines
these migrants built grew into larger temples that began functioning as community centers, and in
that capacity amassed quite some political and economic power. The imperial court attempted to
incorporate the Mazu cult into official ideology in order to prevent it from growing out of state
control. This resulted in a system of officially sanctioned temples that stood opposed to popular
shrines.  The common people,  however,  frequented both,  as they only cared about  the rumored
efficacy of icons.  Even today,  the difference between official  and unofficial  temples  is  of little
interest to commoners – but it still features prominently in the claims to legitimacy of individual
temples.
3.2. The Banka Xinxing-gong
Given the above,  it  should be clear  why the Taipei Tianhou-gong has gone to great  lengths to
provide anyone interested in the history of the temple with detailed materials, including an elaborate
website5 and two books (discussed in more detail in section 5.2.).6 In order not to miss their fair
share of the xinzhong 信眾 (worshiping crowds), the management of the Taipei Tianhou-gong, too,
is caught up in the need to legitimize their temple in accordance with the standards of the dominant
5 http://台北天后宮.tw/
6 These books are offered to visitors for free; see Wang, 2007 and Wang, S. Y. And Xu, J. W., 2011.
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discourse. If we examine the kind of facts the Taipei Tianhou-gong attaches importance to, we find
that the analysis offered by Sangren neatly predicts the contents of the material. 
Although the Xinxing-gong is unrelated to Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan and was never an
official temple during the Qing dynasty, great importance is attached to the origin of the Taipei
Tianhou-gong's Mazu icon and its efficacy. Two theories are posed as to where the icon came from.
According to the first, it is a double of an icon from a Tianhou temple in Xinzhuang (an area in
Taipei that historically preceded the Banka district). The second has it that it was picked up in a
river. Although the second theory leaves something open to people's imagination, the first theory is
interesting because it relies on the ritual of  fenling to be possible.  Since the Xinzhuang temple
precedes the Xinxing-gong, it is older, and since it is older, the icon at the Xinzhuang temple has a
higher chance of itself having ties to the original Meizhou temple. What the Taiwanese reader is
supposed to take away from all this is that the Mazu icon of the Tianhou-gong is older than the
temple itself, potentially comes from a distant place, and may have collected a good three centuries
worth of ling. Even though the Xinxing-gong was not located at the site of today's Taipei Tianhou-
gong, it is still taken to be its spiritual predecessor because the Mazu image of the former now finds
itself enshrined at the latter. Not place, but ling is decisive in determining efficacy. 
This  is  something  that  is  pivotal  for  any  place-based  approach  to  take  into  account,
especially in the East Asian case. Spiritual power is not necessarily tied to any place, but can travel
between places because it is contained in and manifested by certain (movable) objects. Apart from
the kind of detailed account of the various cultural and discursive layers making up specific sites, it
is  therefore  necessary  to  also  consider  these  sites  in  the  context  of  a  broader  economy  of
transferable spiritual power.  It  is  precisely this  feature of the spaces we study that  make them
meaningful constituents of pilgrimage – spiritual power is always on the move. Places are nothing
but  temporary  containers  for  a  kind  of  force  that,  at  least  in  the  minds  of  the  people,  is
fundamentally non-spatial. It can be bought and given as a souvenir to a friend, after all.
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4. The Japanese period
In this chapter, my aim is threefold. The next section presents an overview of the kind of policies
the Japanese pursued when they arranged the religious landscape of Taiwan from 1895 onward.
This allows me to show how Buddhism in general fared in colonial Taiwan, and why it was so easy
to dispose of the Xinxing-gong in 1943. Then, in  section 4.2.,  I  look at  Shingon Buddhism in
particular, and consider the role it played in the cultural life of Taipei. It is in this section that the
Kōbō-ji is studied in more detail, and emplaced in an environment consisting of multiple Shingon
Buddhist sites. I here also discuss the Taipei henro. This copy of the Shikoku henro connected the
various sites in Taipei related to Shingon Buddhism to each other in one single course that took
about four days to complete. In section 4.3., I relate the first-hand account of a man who walked the
Taipei henro, and conclude by offering an analysis of his experiences. 
4.1. Colonial religious policy
In 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki cedes Taiwan from Qing China to Japan. If we understand
movement as a pivotal element of spiritual economies, then the Japanese disrupted this flow and
attempted to relay it into channels dug fresh. The Mazu temples in Taiwan that continued to have
strong ties with the Chinese mainland (especially the coastal areas of Fujian province) throughout
the Qing dynasty suddenly found themselves disallowed to any longer take their icons on jinxiang
across to Strait of Taiwan in order to recharge ling at the mother temple. It is at this point that the
spiritual economy of Taiwan took a mercantilist turn and  ling began rotating between temples in
Taiwan itself – a situation that has by and large remained unchanged ever since, although there have
been successful attempts by various groups to get the governments of China and Taiwan to allow
temples to perform jinxiang by boat (on which more in section 5.1.).
Colonial policy thus affects the status quo to this day. The Japanese initially did not concern
themselves too much with religious affairs, but eventually began to discourage 'native religions'
such as the Mazu cult and promoted Buddhism and later State Shinto in its place. It is against this
background that  we can  understand events  relevant  to  the site  under  scrutiny in  this  thesis,  in
particular  the 1910 establishment  of  the Kōbō-ji  and the 1943 removal  of  the Xinxing-gong.  I
therefore discuss the religious policies of the Japanese during the colonial period in this section in
more detail. In this, I follow the division into three periods as laid out by Charles Jones in his 2003
article Religion in Taiwan at the End of the Japanese Colonial Period. 
The first period lasts from 1895 to 1915, and is marked by a laissez-faire attitude towards
the religious beliefs and practices of the inhabitants of Taiwan. Since the government had to build
the island's infrastructure from scratch and put down insurgencies everywhere, it had little time to
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deal with religious affairs. In fact, unofficially, religious festivals were encouraged with the idea
that this would either make the locals trust the new rulers, or simply too exhausted to continue their
resistance. The Japanese did not deem it necessary to enforce State Shinto at this moment in time as
it  thought  that  the  shared  tradition  of  Buddhism would  form a  much  better  bridge  for  future
expansion  to  the  Fujian  and  Guangdong  provinces  of  the  Chinese  mainland.  Because  of  this
common tradition, it was much easier for Buddhists than it was for Shinto or Christian missionaries
to  find  an  audience  among  the  Taiwanese.  Conversely,  prominent  Taiwanese  Buddhists
subordinated some of their temples administratively under the newly introduced Japanese lineages
in order to reap the benefits of mutual cooperation (Jones, 2003: 19-21). 
The second period begins in 1915 with the Xilai Hermitage incident (Xilia-an shijian 西來庵
事件) and ends with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war in 1937. The Xilai Hermitage
incident nearly triggered a large-scale anti-Japanese uprising, were it not that the central plotters
were discovered and rounded up before any plans could be carried out. The uprising was led by a
religious figure who thought he could rally the Daoist Celestial Generals (the Tai Sui 太歲) and their
spirit armies to his cause. This incident made the Japanese colonial government aware that religious
groups constituted a danger to continued political stability. It was for this reason that they began to
more thoroughly map Taiwan's religious landscape. Taiwanese locals in turn founded new religious
organizations  that  were  meant  to  place  them above government  suspicion.  These  organizations
screened their adherents and made sure they were not engaged in any anti-Japanese activities. The
formation of such organizations and their willingness to cooperate with the colonial government
made greater control over Taiwanese religious life possible. In 1922, the Japanese brought all of
them together under the South Seas Buddhist Association (the Nan'e bukkyōkai 南涼仏教会 ; Ibid.:
21-24). 
One of  the  more  interesting  products  of  the  second period  (as  Jones,  too,  notes)  is  the
investigation into the state of Taiwanese 'native' religions conducted by Marui Keijirō from 1916
onward and published as the Taiwan shūkyō chōsa hōkokusho 台湾宗教調査報告書 in 1919. In the
report, we see how modern categories and sensibilities are projected unto the Taiwanese situation
and normatively applied. In defining what  shūkyō is,  Marui distinguishes between  seishin 正信
('right belief') and meishin, the term we encountered in section 2.1 while discussing Thal's work and
translated  as  'superstition'.  He  goes  on  to  list  the  dangers  of  meishin to  both  society  and  the
individual. It is therefore from as early as 1919 onward that we see how the laissez-faire attitude of
the first period is dropped and replaced with the explicit normative disapproval of any belief that
could not be placed inside the boundaries of either Buddhism or State Shinto. 
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During the  third  period,  which  lasted  from 1937 until  the  end of  the  war  in  1945,  the
Japanese aggressively began pursuing a policy of kōminka 皇民化, or Japanization. The prospect of
total war meant that all resources, including human, were needed for the war effort. However, the
Japanese were uncertain how the Taiwanese, most of whom were ethnically Chinese, would react to
being conscripted into the imperial army. There were no guarantees that Taiwanese troops would
not  defect  as  soon as  they  set  foot  on  Chinese  soil.  The  goal  of  the  kōminka-movement  was
therefore to speed up the cultural assimilation of the emperor's Taiwanese subjects. 
Many measures were thought up at the higher levels of government aimed at making the
Taiwanese give up the Chinese customs of old and definitively turn to Japanese culture – to State
Shinto,  in  particular.  In  the  end,  however,  the  execution  of  these  measures  was  left  to  local
governments. In most parts of the country, they had little or no practical effect; in other places, folk
temples were razed and the icons of their deities destroyed. The latter outcome of the  kōminka-
movement caused public outrage. Journalists claimed it was in violation of the constitution, which
promised freedom of religion to all.  This made local officials even more reluctant to dismantle
Chinese cultural assets. Large parts of the country were thus unaffected by kōminka-related policies.
A climate  of  fear  and  uncertainty,  however,  sped  up  the  process  whereby local  folk  religious
organizations willingly aligned themselves with associations sanctioned by the state. Probably only
a few foresaw the impending collapse of the Japanese empire, and assumed life in the future would
be lived as ethnic Japanese (Jones, 2003: 24-28). 
Before going on to describe how Shingon Buddhism fared in Taiwan during the colonial
period in the next section, let me first return to the fate of the Xinxing-gong. Since it was razed in
1943, its destruction cannot be said to have been a direct result of the kōminka-movement. The most
destructive phase of the kōminka-movement was between 1938 and 1940, when the new governor-
general ordered a stop to what were called 'temple-restructuring activities'. However, the destruction
of the Xinxing-gong was indirectly related to the  kōminka-movement as it, at least at the official
level, made destroying temples much easier – especially if one had a good reason. 
According to one of the books produced by the Taipei Tianhou-gong itself,  titled  Yuedu
Taipei Tianhou-gong 讀臺北天后宮閱 ,7 the Japanese razed the temple in order to broaden the road
so  as  to  make  Taihoku  (the  Japanese  name  for  Taipei)  less  vulnerable  to  American  aerial
bombardments (which became a serious problem from 1944 onward). The same book also has it
that the Mazu icon that is now in the Taipei Tianhou-gong was moved from the Xinxing-gong to the
nearby Longshan-si 龍山寺 for temporary safekeeping. How it ended up in the Taipei Tianhou-gong
will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter.  For  now,  let  us  examine  the  development  of  Shingon
7 See Wang, 2007. 
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Buddhism in Taiwan during the colonial period. 
4.2. The dissemination of Shingon Buddhism
Little  scholarly attention  has  been paid  to  Shingon Buddhism and its  development  in  colonial
Taiwan. Especially in the English language, material is scarce. The reason for this is most likely that
Shingon  Buddhism was  one  of  many  Japanese  Buddhist  sects  active  in  Taiwan  –  and  it  was
certainly not the biggest among them, as we shall see. Jones' 1999 Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion
and the State, 1660-1990 does devote some attention to the topic of Japanese Buddhism in general
during the colonial period, but primarily focuses on Chinese Buddhist lineages and the way they
coped with the new situation. In Chinese and Japanese, more material is available – but since data is
rather scarce, from it only a partial picture can emerge. Given the current popularity of the Shikoku
henro with  the  Taiwanese,  cross-cultural  exchange  is  intensifying,  and  more  Taiwanese  and
Japanese scholars may feel inclined to study the Shingon Buddhism of the colonial period in the
nearby future. A recent study useful to my purposes in this section is offered by Lin Cheng Wei in
his 2012  Zongjiao zaoxing yu minsu chuancheng: rizhiqi zaitai Riren shumin xinyang shijie 宗教造
型與民俗傳承: 日治期在臺日人庶民信仰世界. He primarily departs from artifacts that can still be
found scattered across the Taiwanese landscape, and makes use of newspapers and materials from
the former colonial archives to reconstruct their past use and context. He pays special attention to
the many utsushi reijō (copies of the Shikoku henro and Saikoku junrei) founded during the second
half of Japanese rule. In this section, I reproduce the history of Shingon Buddhism in Taiwan by
drawing on Lin's work, among others.
Japanese Buddhist priests accompanied Japanese soldiers in combat during the first Sino-
Japanese  war  (1894-1895).  When  Taiwan  was  ceded  to  Japan  in  1895,  resistance  among  the
inhabitants  remained  fierce  and  had to  be  put  down.  Jones  mentions  that  the  primary task  of
Japanese Buddhist priests stationed in Taiwan at  first was to provide spiritual services (such as
funerals) exclusively to Japanese troops stationed in, and the few civilians who had migrated to,
Taiwan (1999: 34). Nakagawa Mirai reports that in the specific case of the Shingon sect it was
decided  even  before  arrival  in  Taiwan  that  priests  should  dedicate  themselves  to  missionary
activities (2016: 44). Since so few Japanese civilians lived in Taiwan during this early tumultuous
period, the Chinese population became the object of most missionary activity. The language barrier,
however, was too severe for missionary work to result in many new converts. For this reason, it was
decided to  first  teach the  locals  Japanese  by setting  up language schools.  This  early period of
missionary activity came to an end from 1899 onward, when the Japanese government withdrew
their funding of Buddhism and invested it into the promotion of State Shinto (Jones, 1999: 34-35).
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In order to obtain funds, Japanese Buddhist sects that had settled in Taiwan now began targeting
Japanese migrants, who were on average much more well-off. 
In the specific case of the Shingon sect, a missionary post had been set up as early as 1896 in
the Banka district  of Taipei (where the Xinxing-gong was also located).  By 1899, the post had
moved to nearby Shinkigai 新起街 (in today's Ximen-ding 西門町). Since the Shingon sect, too, was
hit  with financial difficulty following political changes back home, this move can explained by
considering that Japanese natives preferred to live in Shinkigai – in fact, the area eventually came to
be affectionately known as the Asakusa of Taihoku. It was there that money could be earned by
catering to the rich. Following the construction of the Kōbō-ji in 1910, more serious attention could
be paid to providing medical attention to the sick, educating the poor and helping the jobless find an
occupation. In 1913, a place for people to stay the night was added to the temple grounds. Special
effort  was  also  made  to  educate  Taiwan's  aboriginal  population  –  to  them,  Kōbō Daishi  was
presented as an ideal teacher and bringer of civilization. Finally, the Kōbō-ji also offered a place for
the Japanese to turn to with their spiritual needs – that is to say, a place where one could obtain
genze riyaku in, for example, times of sickness (Nakagawa, 2016: 45). 
That missionary work had not yielded a great number of new devotees can be inferred from
the fact that their number was reported to be at 752 in 1910, when the Kōbō-ji was constructed
(Ibid.). By 1941, their number would have risen to 8,548, only 1,040 of who were ethnic Chinese
(Jones, 2003: 36). Shingon Buddhism thus remained a marginal sect all throughout the colonial
period, especially when compared with other sects, the Japanese population in general, and the total
population of Taiwan. For example, the Jōdo Shin-shū 浄土真宗 – who finished construction on the
Taihoku Nishihongan-ji 台北西本願寺 in 1912 (located in Shinkigai as well, just around the corner
from the Kōbō-ji) – had grown to 26,410 devotees by 1941, of whom 5,184 were ethnic Chinese
(Ibid.). To put these numbers into perspective: by 1900, an estimated 38,000 Japanese had settled in
Taiwan. By 1915, this number had risen to 135,400. In 1941, around 365,000 Japanese were living
in Taiwan. The total population of Taiwan increased from 2,546,000 in 1895 to 4,733,300 in 1935
(Watt, 2009: 21-23). The Shingon sect was composed of a marginal group of people, indeed.
It has to be mentioned here, though, that the number of registered devotees does not reflect
the  actual  number  of  people  who  in  some  way  or  another  engaged  with  Shingon  Buddhism.
Although I am speaking here of 'missionary' activity, it has been noted in section 2.3. that we should
not assume the Japanese to subscribe to a single religious creed. The great majority of the Japanese
living in Taihoku most likely visited temples belonging to different denominations, curious to see
what kind of ritual services each had on offer. Many Japanese people who were never registered
must have frequented the Kōbō-ji. In competition with the other temples, the priests of the Kōbō-ji
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probably did their best to offer ritual services corresponding to the spiritual needs of the local elite.
It would therefore be wrong to assume that the adherents of Shingon Buddhism in Taiwan primarily
concerned themselves with obtaining new converts – rather, what they were actually looking for
was a market, or clientele, for the ritual solutions to life's problems they had on offer. 
 In 1912, an image of Kōbō Daishi was placed on a hilltop (Matsubayama 松葉山 , today's
Danfengshan 丹鳳山) near Beitou 北投, which had by then grown into an area full of hot springs
and was therefore teeming with business opportunities. Beitou forms yet another example of a place
where Japanese Buddhist sects eagerly constructed temples in order to cater to the many Japanese
present there – in the case of Beitou, tourists. The Kōbō Daishi-iwa 弘法大師岩 , as it came to be
called,  was sponsored by a woodworking company called Sawatoku Matsu  沢徳松 .  It  became
customary for their kō 講 to perform sankei to the site every year on the 21st of the third month of
the kyūreki 旧暦 (the old calendar), the day of the nyūjō 入定 of Kōbō Daishi (his entry into eternal
meditation until the arrival of the buddha Miroku  弥勒 ). In 1924, a monument commemorating
Kōbō Daishi was added, and in 1926 an image of Namikiri Fudō Myōō 波切不動明王 installed. 
The Kōbō Daishi-iwa became known among tourists as a reijō 霊場, and many who paid a
visit to the hot springs of Beitou went up to enjoy the view and pay their respects to Kōbō Daishi
(Nakagawa, 2016: 45). Not mentioned by Nakagawa (perhaps as it  has no direct connection to
Kōbō Daishi) is another site at the other end of Beitou today known as the  Budong Mingwang
Shiku 不動明王石窟 . Inside the grotto, a certain Sano Sōtarō – who operated a hot spring resort
called Hoshi no yu 星乃湯 nearby – installed an image of Fudō Myōō in 1925. 
Again, we should not forget that the number of devotees mentioned above registered with
the Shingon sect in Taiwan does not reflect the amount of people, such as tourists, who frequented
sites  related  to  Shingon Buddhism such as  the  Kōbō-ji,  the  Kōbō Daishi-iwa and the  Budong
Mingwang Shiku.  Given  the  popularity  of  Beitou  among  Japanese  living  in  Taiwan,  it  can  be
imagined that tens of thousands of them went up to the Kōbō Daishi-iwa as part of a stay at one of
the hot spring resorts.
The year 1925 also saw the birth of the Taihoku Shin Shikoku Hachijūhakkasho Reijō 台北新
四国八十八所霊場 , or Taipei henro in short. The course was thought up by five Japanese living in
Taipei, and planning on it took roughly a year. Permission to put it into place was granted by the
sōtokufu 総督府 (the colonial government office) on April 10, 1925. On April 14 of the same year
(the 21st of the third month of the kyūreki – again, the day of Kōbō Daishi's nyūjō), representatives
of the sects involved in maintaining the Taipei henro – Jōdo-shū, Rinzai-shū, Sōtō-shū and naturally
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Shingon-shū – met at the Kōbō-ji for a kaigen kuyō 開眼供養, a type of Buddhist service held upon
the installation of Buddhist images. Stone statues representing the honzon 本尊 (a Buddhist temple's
main image) of the eighty-eight temples of the Shikoku  henro were placed at different locations
between Taipei and Beitou, including on the temple grounds of the four sects involved. Similar to
the actual  Shikoku  henro,  the Taipei  henro brought  these different  sects  together  as the course
transcended the sectarian boundaries between them (Lin, 2012: 54). 
Lin has managed to reconstruct the route using contemporary newspaper articles and the
personal account that features in the next section. Pilgrims could find the first and second honzon
(Shaka 釈迦 and Amida 阿弥陀) representing temple one, Ryōzen-ji 霊山寺, and two, Gokuraku-ji
極楽寺, placed immediately to the right of the entrance upon entering the Kōbō-ji. The third stone
statue could be found at a shrine dedicated to the Shinto deity Inari 稲荷 in Banka. Pilgrims did not
have to leave the city until the eleventh statue, which was located, together with statues twelve to
eighteen, at the Rinzai-ji 臨済寺 on the outskirts. From there on, pilgrims would have to go into the
wilderness of the mountains. Statues number nineteen to thirty-five were encountered traversing
Shizangan 芝山巖; number thirty-six to forty-four while walking the mountain trail from Shirin 士林
to Kusayama 草山  (today's  Yangmingshan  陽明山 );  and up to seventy-nine on the way from
Kusayama into Beitou. Eighty could be found close to Sano's Hoshi no yu. From there to the Kōbō
Daishi-iwa, numbers eighty-one to eighty-seven were located. The final statue was located at the
Tesshin-in 鐵真院, a temple belonging to the Rinzai sect built at the foot of the Matsubayama. From
here, the center of Beitou could be reached in five minutes. Pilgrims needed an average of three to
four days to complete the circuit. 
In  the  next  section,  I  hope  to  make  the  Kōbō-ji  and  the  Taipei  henro come  to  life  by
translating and commenting on passages from the dairy of a person who walked it. Since I will not
return to these sites (except for the Kōbō-ji) again, let me here conclude this section by briefly
mentioning their present-day status. Following the end of the war and the sudden expatriation of all
Japanese nationals back to Japan, the sites fell into disrepair. The Kōbō Daishi-iwa is still accessible
by those who know of its location, but there is no actual (paved) path leading to it. The structures
that once stood at the site are now in ruins (see figure 1 on the next page). What remains are two
altars carved out of rock – one for Dainichi 大日 , a buddha of central importance to the Shingon
school of Japanese Buddhism, and one for Namikiri Fudō Myōō (see figure 2 on page 31). It seems
that people who know of its history still  visit it  regularly to make offerings, such as water and
incense. The  Budong Mingwang Shiku is accessible quite easily by car, and even today attracts
people who seek some peace and quiet. Statue number eighty-one of the former Taipei henro can be
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found at a temple, the Longyun-si  龍雲寺 , close-by. The  Tesshin-in that formerly housed statue
number eighty-eight is still standing and is today called the Puji-si 普濟寺.8 
As for the Taipei henro itself, many statues were destroyed or went missing. Some are still
standing on their original locations; others have been moved. Lin conjectures that, following the
war, many statues were removed and found their way to the antiques market. It is for this reason
that we now find some of them part  of museum collections,  while others have been moved to
different temple grounds, where they are either serve decorative purposes, are actively used (Ibid.:
67). The former kind can be found at the Zhengyuan-si 正願寺 near Taipei's Jiannan Road subway
station. The temple has in its possession seven of the Taipei henro's statues, while none were ever
located here. It furthermore owns two statues depicting Kōbō Daishi, and one of Monju Bosatsu 文
殊菩薩 . At the former Rinzai-ji (now know by its Mandarin name, Linji-si), some statues went
missing, while a few new ones were moved here. For example, number eighty – formerly located at
Sano's Hoshi no yu – is now located there. These are of the latter kind; temple staff offer incense to
them on a daily basis. The first and second statue can still be found to the right of the entrance of
8 A sign at the entrance of the temple erroneously mentions that the Puji-si started in 1905 as a temple belonging to 
the Shingon sect. This would mean that the Tesshin-in predated the Kōbō-ji by five years, which is highly unlikely. 
Lin Fen Yu reports that the Tesshin-in started 1905 as a simple dwelling for priests belonging to the Rinzai sect to 
spend the night. Its hondō 本堂 is constructed in 1915; by then the Tesshin-in had become an active fukyōjo for 
Rinzai missionary activity in Beitou. In 1934, the whole temple was renovated. The temple is presently affiliated 
with Chinese Pure Land Buddhism (Lin, 2009: 177-180). 
30
Figure 1: The remains of the Kōbō Daishi-iwa. The path to the right leads to the altar of Dainichi.
The path on the left leads to the altar of Namikiri Fudō Myōō.
what today is no longer the Kōbō-ji, but the Taipei Tianhou-gong. They find themselves surrounded
by other statues depicting popular Japanese deities, all most likely made during the colonial period.
I return to these statues in chapter six. 
4.3. An account of the Taipei henro
We can learn more about the way in which ordinary people experienced the Kōbō-ji and the Taipei
henro by  studying  the  personal  writings  of  those  who  walked  it.  Unfortunately,  there  is  little
material to work with. The Taipei henro was but one of many copies spread all over Japan, and only
few would have felt motivated to publish any kind of personal reflection on it in any journal or
newspaper. Luckily, a person writing under the name of Sankurō 三九郎  did publish a series of
articles on his four-day tour of the Taipei henro in the Taiwan Tsūshin Kyōkai Zasshi 臺灣通信協会
雑誌. His account, titled Taihoku shin Shikoku hachijūhakkasho junrei no ki 臺北新四国八十八箇所
巡礼の記, is spread out over three issues; two of them published in 1934, the third in 1935. In this
section, I start by summing up the contents of the first two issues, covering the first two days of
Sankurō's four day trip. Unfortunately, there only seem to be three issues – a fourth issue detailing
Sankurō's final day was, as far as I can tell, never published. I conclude with a brief analysis of
some of the account's central themes. 
From the opening, it is immediately clear that Sankurō writes in a different day and age. He
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Figure 2: Current status of the altar for Namikiri Fudō Myōō at the Kōbō Daishi-iwa.
begins:
When you say the word junrei, then anyone will immediately think of O-tsuru お鶴 of Awa no
Naruto 阿波の鳴戸.
'Well then, your father's name would be...' (Sankurō, 1934 [no. 153]: 97)
In writing this,  Sankurō believes to prompt a picture familiar to everyone. Today, however, few
(except for the elderly) will associate the term junrei with any person named O-tsuru. People might
be confused as to exactly where Awa lies, but then certainly associate it with Tokushima prefecture
upon hearing of Naruto, a place today known for its whirlpools. Quite a few modern-day pilgrims
will pass by Naruto on their way to the first temple of the Shikoku henro, the Ryōzen-ji, which lies
just a few kilometers away from there. At any rate, the O-tsuru Sankurō refers to here is the main
character of a bunraku-play 文楽 (a kind of theater with puppets) titled Awa no Naruto. To keep a
long story short: O-tsuru is a girl who leaves Naruto on a  junrei in order to find the parents she
never knew. Her father has been sent to Osaka on a mission to retrieve stolen treasure belonging to
the Awa-clan. This required him to change his name and go undercover with the robbers. Exactly at
the moment a messenger warns his wife that they have been exposed and should leave immediately,
their daughter turns up at their doorstep. O-tsuru's mother recognizes her daughter's accent, and asks
her where she is from and who her mother and father are. Upon answering, O-tsuru's mother knows
without doubt that the pilgrim at her door is in fact her own daughter. Tragically, however, she
cannot reveal her true identity as this risks putting her daughter in harms' way. 
 Sankurō immediately distances himself  from the tragic  figure of  O-tsuru and identifies
himself as just an average Joe – somewhat chubby, and therefore not physically fit for going on
something as grave as a  junrei. When one goes on a  henro, however, it is not at all necessary to
have a lofty purpose or to be physically fit; in that case, wearing the right kind of equipment is
enough. Sankurō has obtained gear such as a sedge-woven hat (sugegasa 菅笠) with dōgyō ninin
written on it, a kongōzue 金剛杖 (a walking staff representing Kōbō Daishi), and an easy shoulder
bag called a sanyabukuro 山野袋. 
The bus he rides to get to the Kōbō-ji goes down the same route he has to take every day to
get to work. On this particular day, however, the whole world appears to him in a different light. In
all the four years he has lived in Taipei, never did the town appear as beautiful as today. Not only
does the world appear different to Sankurō – he also appears different to the world. People treat him
in an entirely different – more positive – manner. Sankurō attributes this to the virtue (gotoku 御徳)
32
of Kōbō Daishi. He is full of gratitude to Kōbō Daishi for receiving the kind service he does now
that he is embarking on a  henro.  At the bus stop in front of the  tokkantei 督官邸  (the former
headquarters of the colonial government that today serves as the presidential palace), three more
people dressed in a similar manner as Sankurō get on the bus. Even though they are strangers, he
greets them as though they are familiar friends – they are all going to trod down the same path and
are by that fact alone intimately connected. 
Upon entering the Kōbō-ji, the garden of which reminds him of Gokuraku Jōdo 極楽浄土
(the Pure Land), Sankurō finds many people already gathered there. He is not walking alone. At the
temple, he meets with other  henro  who will accompany him on the journey. Some of them have
already walked the course multiple  times.  One person relates  to  Sankurō that  he finds  himself
wanting to go on the Taipei  henro  every time he has a couple of days off. Knowing that he will
embark on the  henro together with these people,  hearing the sound of bells  (suzu 鈴 ) and the
chanting of  eika  詠歌  (songs calling to mind the landscape of each of the eighty-eight temples)
along the way, Sankurō feels as if he is about to depart for the Pure Land itself. 
After performing the necessary rites at statues number one and two, the group makes its way
to the Inari shrine in Banka. It is here that Sankurō receives his first o-settai お接待 (gifts offered to
journeying pilgrims), namely a cup of tea. On the way to the fourth statue, the group enters the
Longshan-si and chant sutra's. Sankurō mentions that the 'islanders' (本島人達) see them off. The
fourth and fifth statues are found opposite the temple, at a shrine dedicated to  Fudō Myōō. The
group takes a break, receives another cup of tea, and have a morning snack in the form of an o-
nigiri. Sankurō had prepared some o-nigiri himself before leaving his house in the morning, but o-
settai cannot be refused. 
The next stop is a branch office of the Sōtō-shū Tōmon Betsuin  曹洞宗東門別院 , where
statue number sixteen had been moved (it today indeed cannot be found at the Linji-si). At the
Betsuin itself, after chanting eika, Sankurō sits down to have his own o-nigiri and yet more tea. He
talks with an elderly women who came over from Keelung in order to walk the Taipei henro for the
first  time. Her son had objected to her going alone,  but she assured him by saying she would
certainly be accompanied by  Kōbō Daishi  and therefore perfectly safe.  After  having heard the
elderly lady's story,  Sankurō muses that she may be an incarnation (keshin 化身) of Kōbō Daishi
himself. That day, he would walk up to number eighteen – to the Rinzai-ji. 
He would spend the night back home, and return early the next morning to continue onward.
Since the next section of the Taipei henro would take him out of the city and into the mountains, he
and his fellow henro were to stay at a yado 宿 (a guesthouse) that night. Similar to certain parts of
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the Shikoku henro even today, the section from Shirin to Kusayama was rough and required people
to not only use their kongōzue for support, but also for clearing away the tall grass. Parts of the path
had overgrown and people had to stick close to their sendatsu 先達 (guide) in order not to lose the
way. The skies were grey, but it had not yet started raining or the path would have turned slippery.
Many statues were placed on the way; between number thirty-five and thirty-six the group finally
had a chance to take a break at the Shizan-jinja 芝山神社. The rain started falling by the time they
reached number  forty-one.  Upon arriving at  the  yado near  number forty-five,  Sankurō and the
others could finally have the bath they had been looking forward to all day, and the prospect of
which had indeed made the whole endeavor bearable. Before he goes to sleep, Sankurō cleans the
tip of the kongōzue, which symbolizes the feet of Kōbō Daishi. As he gets comfortable in his futon,
his body all tired, he describes how a he reaches a state of muga 無我, or egolessness, and falls into a
deep sleep. 
An interesting picture emerges from Sankurō's writings. His experience of the Taipei henro
does not differ much from the way in which the average Japanese person today would experience
the actual Shikoku henro. Naturally, we have every reason to assume Sankurō's experience to have
been shaped by culturally determined patterns. In fact, his articles have been written in a generic
style that one would also encounter when reading accounts written for other Japanese newspapers
on the Shikoku henro or any of its copies. 
We encountered the most  important  of  the  culturally determined patterns  of  the way in
which the Japanese experience pilgrimage in section 2.4. The first I take up here is the collection of
kudoku in  order  to  obtain  genze  riyaku.  Sankurō's  constant  small-talk  concerning age  with  his
fellow henro appears trivial, but it gives away important cultural information. The reason for this is
that it are mostly the sick – and therefore the old – that have any need for genze riyaku, that is to
say,  a way to cure sickness and common ailments that accompany old-age.  Sankurō defies this
cultural pattern in that he is only thirty-nine years old. The common perception is that people who
embark on any pilgrimage in Japan have a clear reason or motivation for doing so, rooted in an
episode of personal crisis. For example, the common perception of a young woman walking the
henro is  that  she  must  have  recently  been  through  a  breakup,  or  worse,  divorce.  Sankurō  is
somewhat special in that he seems to be walking the  henro for nothing other than his personal
enjoyment. 
However, it is highly likely for him to have ulterior motives for walking the Taipei  henro
that he does not explicitly write about. He might collecting  kudoku for someone else – someone
unable to do it him or herself. It is in fact revealed that Sankurō grew up at the foot of the mountain
where temple twenty-seven of the Shikoku henro, the Konomine-ji 神峯寺, is situated. His mother
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had always wanted to walk the Shikoku henro, but now that she has reached old age, this is a dream
that is unlikely to be fulfilled. Sankurō therefore may walk this particular copy of the henro in her
stead, assuming the kudoku obtained to be transferable. 
The second cultural pattern that stands out in  Sankurō's account is the projection of other-
worlds.  Temples  are  perceived to  be heterotopia,  that  is  to  say,  places  that  have  actually been
realized as utopia. Sankurō mentions Gokuraku Jōdo multiple times in the text, and each time it is
to stress the heterotopic character of his experience. Upon entering the temple grounds of the Kōbō-
ji,  Sankurō remarks it is as if he has reached Gokuraku Jōdo. The excitement of embarking on a
journey with other people while hearing the sound of  suzu ringing and eika being chanted makes
Sankurō feel as if he is departing for Gokuraku Jōdo itself. When he is inside the Daishidō 大師堂
(hall of Kōbō Daishi) of the Kōbō-ji, listening to the chanting of sutra's and the ringing of bells, he
feels as if the connection with the evil of the zokuse 俗世 (ordinary world) is temporarily broken, so
that the purity of the human soul (tamashii 魂) can break through in what amounts to a momentary
realization of the Pure Land (genze no gokuraku 現世の極楽). These and other examples make it
clear Sankurō actively seeks out places where the ordinary and ideal worlds meet.  His attitude
reflects that Max Moerman's pilgrims to Kumano, who themselves are seeking contact with one of
many possible ideal worlds and intend to reap the positive effects such contact is believed to entail. 
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5. The post-war period
The next section first considers political changes that occurred after the Japanese left Taiwan in
1945. What kind of new policies were put into place by the government of the Republic of China to
manage the religious landscape left behind by the Japanese? By answering this question, a backdrop
is obtained against which I can subsequently consider the Kōbō-ji's transformation into the Taipei
Tianhou-gong in section 5.2. This discussion sets up the sixth chapter, in which I show how the
Shingon Buddhist heritage of the Taipei Tianhou-gong is currently being reactivated by enthusiasts
of Japanese culture and the Shikoku henro. 
5.1. Post-colonial political developments
By the time they left the island, half a century of Japanese rule had left its mark on the religious
landscape of Taiwan. During the Qing dynasty, temples and shrines had not only been places of
worship, but also communal centers. In that capacity, they were important markers of social identity
– and therefore powerful political and economic entities. The Japanese stripped these centers of
their power and used modern categories such as shūkyo and meishin to promote Buddhism and State
Shinto. As Jones further mentions, the construction of railway network enabled certain places to
gain prominence nation-wide. Among the Japanese, Beitou was one such a place. This network
could also be used by Chinese temples to draw costumers, thereby allowing certain sites to rise to a
level  of  prominence  unheard  of  before  the  country's  modernization.  If  anything,  the  Japanese
showed how tourism and temple visits go hand in hand (Jones, 2003: 32). 
The kōminka-movement turned out to be only a prelude to disaster to come. The Japanese
were expatriated home as the Kuomintang 國民黨 (the Chinese Nationalist Party) assumed control
over  the  island.  Hopes of  the  Taiwanese  that  they would  be  allowed a  certain  degree  of  self-
governance were quickly shattered as important posts were given away to Mainlanders. Tensions
mounted and came to an explosive climax on February 28, 1947, when rioting erupted in the streets
of  Taipei.  Two months  later,  troops  from the  Mainland arrived  and indiscriminately massacred
anywhere between 2,000 and 10,000 people (Lai, Myers and Wou, 1991). 
When the Kuomintang was subsequently defeated on the Mainland by the Communist Party
of China in 1949 it was forced to relocate to Taiwan and set up a provisional government there.
Since many religious institutions feared the atheist attitude of the Communist Party, they moved to
the  island  as  well.  The  Kuomingtang  used  this  as  a  proof  that  they  respected  the  freedom of
religion. In reality, however, it was deeply suspicious of religious societies and monks that came
over from the Mainland, as these might harbor Communist sympathies. It is for this reason that the
Kuomintang required all religious organizations to register themselves; those who refused to do so
36
were harassed. Temples had to register as being either Buddhist or Daoist, a system that exists to
this day. The Kuomintang was furthermore suspicious of religious associations from the Japanese
period, such as Tenrikyō 天理教 and the Sōka Gakkai 創価学会. Of these associations it was thought
that they worked with Japanese extremists who never accepted the loss of the Empire of Japan
(Laliberté, 2009: 61-63). 
The religious and cultural policy of Kuomintang-led Taiwan from 1949 onward was three-
pronged. First, rigorous attempts were made to eradicate Japanese elements in society. Whereas the
final  decade  of  Japanese  rule  saw  Japanese  raised  to  the  status  of  national  language,  the
Kuomintang decided that all public discourse should be in  guoyu 國語 , or Mandarin (Rubinstein,
2003:  217).  Second,  Taiwanese  identity  had  to  be  downplayed.  The  use  of  local  dialects,  for
example taiwanhua 台灣話 ,  was discouraged. The nationalist  government tried to prevent  the
expression of Taiwanese identity in the local religions. We here see how the modern normative
opposition of religion versus superstition was once more put into play. The Kuomintang's attitude
towards religion in many ways resembled that of the Japanese during the second and third periods
distinguished in section 4.1.: there were good religions, such as Catholicism, which had a clear
organizational structure; and bad religions, such as the folk religious practices of the Taiwanese. In
the end, however – and again similar to the Japanese – the Kuomintang did not actively restrain the
local religions, since it wanted to place itself into a favorable light next to Chinese Communist
Party. Third, Chinese identity was actively promoted. When the Communist Party unchained the
Cultural Revolution in 1966, which sought to dispose the Mainland of 'backward' Chinese cultural
heritage, the Kuomintang launched the Zhonghua wenhua fuxing weiyuanhui 中華文化復興委員會
(Commission  for  the  Chinese  Cultural  Renaissance)  in  1967,  which  instead  sought  to  affirm
Chinese cultural identity (Laliberté, 2009: 63). 
However, attempts to prevent the development of Taiwanese political self-awareness were
doomed to fail when the country began to prosper economically during the the 1970s. More and
more people began to see Taiwan as a society distinct from China – a society that would have to
start walking its own path (Ibid.: 64). Increased wealth and education did not turn the Taiwanese
away from the popular religions, but rather drove them right to it. One example of this is Weller's
case of the Eighteen Kings temple, which benefited from the nation-wide lottery craze (see section
2.1.). Increasing democratization of the country's political structure additionally meant a lot of new
organizations  could  flourish.  In  the  case  of  Buddhism,  the  state-sponsored  Zhongguo fojiaohui
(Buddhist Association of the Republic of China) lost its monopoly, and philanthropic organizations
such as the Buddhist Compassionate Relief Association could begin to thrive (see section 2.4.). By
the 1990s the policy of discouraging the expression of Taiwanese identity in religious culture had
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become untenable; it is today no longer pursued. 
The Mazu cult was able to flourish in the new political climate, and in fact managed to press
a stamp on some of the country's elections. In the 2000 presidential elections, for example, several
candidates attempted to gain the support of certain communities by campaigning at  local Mazu
temples. Some went as far as to hold divination rituals to demonstrate that Mazu herself supported
them. The influence of the more powerful temples has extended beyond elections, and some of have
even meddled with foreign policy. When the Mainland and Taiwan established informal contact in
1987, the first people to go back were Taiwanese searching for their religious roots. The Zhenlan-
gong  鎮瀾宮  in Dajia  大甲 , one of the temples involved in the battle for legitimacy outlined in
section 3.1., made use of the opportunity to organize jinxiang to Meizhou in order to recharge the
ling of their Mazu icon. There was no way for them, however, to go to Meizhou directly by boat;
instead, they had to take the indirect route by airplane via Hong Kong. The temple's chairman tried
to leverage the temple's political influence to get the Taiwanese government to allow direct jinxiang
to Meizhou. He eventually succeeded – in 2002, a group of Taiwanese pilgrims traveled by boat to
nearby Xiamen (Katz, 2003: 406-408). 
During my fieldwork, I have found that Mazu is today inextricably linked to Taiwanese
national identity. Early Kuomintang efforts to discourage the local religions out of fear of a strong
Taiwanese identity have thus ultimately failed. Mazu has grown from a local goddess of the sea to
the Empress of Heaven, and from an all-powerful protective deity to the patron goddess of the
whole of Taiwan itself. I want to stress once more that not all people who are fond of Mazu thereby
automatically belong to a 'religious cult'. Her popularity is rather the result of her accessibility:
anyone can step into one of her temples. Just as it is common for people in the West to celebrate
Christmas without any feelings of religiosity involved, people in Taiwan feel attracted to Mazu and
go to consult her whenever life's problems become overwhelming. They may go on the popular,
yearly jinxiang from the Zhenlan-gong to the Fengtian-gong 奉天宮 in Chiayi 嘉義 because they
enjoy the communal feeling of being among jubilant crowds. 
5.2. From Kōbō-ji to Taipei Tianhou-gong
In 1945, the Japanese lose Second World War, and temples such as the Kōbō-ji face an uncertain
future. After the Japanese are expatriated home in 1946, many sites related to Japanese Buddhism
and State Shinto are left abandoned. In the case of our site, the wooden buildings making up the
Kōbō-ji burned down in 1953. A new temple is built in its stead in 1959. The name 'Taipei Tianhou-
gong',  however,  has  only been in  official  use since 1967.  This  leaves a  period of roughly two
decades in  which the temple is  known respectively as the Xinxing-gong and the Taiwan-sheng
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Tianhou-gong 台灣省天后宮. The reader will recall that the original Xinxing-gong was destroyed in
1943. Following the conclusion of the war,  the Kōbō-ji  is  handed over  to the followers of the
Xinxing-gong. This particular handover,  however,  occurs in 1948 – precisely in the tumultuous
period when the Nationalists from the Mainland attempt to secure control over the island. It  is
perhaps  for  this  reason  that  the  history  of  the  changeover  from  Kōbō-ji  to  Xinxing-gong  is
somewhat unclear. 
The book  Yuedu Taipei Tianhougong (self-published by the Taipei Tianhou-gong in 2005)
makes mention of two theories as to how the Kōbō-ji was ceded to people of the Xinxing-gong. The
first theory holds that the believers of the Xinxing-gong simply remodeled the main hall of the
Kōbō-ji (presumably the Daishidō) to fit their purposes. This theory has it that the Department of
Education of Taipei municipality handed over the Kōbō-ji  to them in 1950, when the Japanese
priests running the temple returned to Japan. The second theory is more detailed than the first, and
offers different dates. This version has it that the secretary of the Department of Education, Huang
Qi Rui 黃 瑞啟 , assigned the Hokke-ji 法華寺 (or Fahua-si in Mandarin, situated in today's Ximen-
ding as well) to serve as the new Xinxing-gong in 1948. The Hokke-ji, however, was built oriented
towards the east; the original Xinxing-gong had been built facing the south, something the temple's
followers  were  peculiar  about.  The  followers  therefore  proposed  the  Kōbō-ji  as  a  suitable
replacement for the Xinxing-gong, and held a moving-in ceremony that same year. The Buddhist
priests still present in the temple protested against this with the central government (at the time still
situated in Nanjing), accusing Huang of giving illegal approvals. The central government, however,
ruled in favor of Huang and the followers of the Xinxing-gong. 
Both theories are most likely inaccurate. The first theory assumes Japanese priests to still
have  been  present  in  the  Kōbō-ji  by  1950,  but  this  cannot  be  true,  as  all  Japanese  had  been
repatriated back to Japan in 1946. The second theory has been contested by Kan Cheng Tseng in a
2006 article of the Taipei Wenxian 臺北文獻. According to him, even before the Kōbō-ji had been
handed over to the followers of the Xinxing-gong, it had been placed under the care of Chen Zong
Tan 陳宗坦 by the last jūshoku 住職 (head priest) of the Kōbō-ji, Kichikawa Hōjō 吉川法城. The
latter  also  returned  to  Japan  in  1946.  This  transfer  was  recognized  by  the  secretary  of  the
Department of Education at the time, and the temple was renamed Ciguangchan-si 慈光禪寺. When
Huang assumed the position of secretary,  he repealed the decision, and gave the Kōbō-ji to the
followers of the Xinxing-gong. The Zhongguo fojiaohui protested against the decision by sending
letters to multiple government departments, complaining that the Kōbō-ji, a Buddhist temple, had
been ceded to a  non-Buddhist  organization (the  followers  of  the Xinxing-gong).  Their  primary
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argument was that many of the Kōbō-ji's structures had been erected using donations of followers,
and  as  such  should  belong  to  the  Zhongguo  fojiaohui,  instead  of  being  treated  as  the  private
property of the expatriated Japanese. Their complaints, however, ultimately amounted to nothing,
and the handover went through. In 1952, a few months before the Kōbō-ji were to burn down, the
temple was once again renamed, this time from Xinxing-gong to Taiwan-sheng Tianhou-gong. 
The 2011 book Taipei Tianhougong de lishi 台北天后宮的歷史 (self-published by the Taipei
Tianhou-gong as well) amends some of the inaccuracies from the 2007 book. A division into two
different theories is now no longer made. The section on the history of the temple between 1945 and
1949 reads as a reply to Kan's objections to the content of Yuedu Taipei Tianhougong, even though
no explicit reference is made to him. Mention is now made of the Ciguangchan-si, and the reason
for Chen's removal as the head of the temple is stated to have been mismanagement. In his article,
Kan implies that the removal of Chen on the grounds of mismanagement was nothing but an excuse
used  to  appropriate  the  temple.  The  2011  book,  however,  mentions  that  the  objections  of  the
Zhongguo fojiaohui were judged to be without sufficient ground; after Huang won the lawsuit, the
affair was settled. The moving-in ceremony of the Mazu icon temporarily kept at the Longshan-si is
dated in the book to July 7, 1948. 
What are we to make of these differing accounts? The point of bringing up the legal battle
concerning the legitimate ownership of what remained of the Kōbō-ji is not to argue in anyone's
favor, but to show how the history of the temple is contested, and that, as shown in section 3.1., any
historical narrative provided by temples themselves cannot be taken at face value. It is clear that the
feud that took place between different parties during the first post-war years is still with us today.
Kan explicitly argues that a Buddhist temple should serve only the goals of Buddhism, not of folk
religion (2006: 52). Whether his argument has made an impression or not, the Taipei Tianhou-gong
does allow Shingon Buddhist services to take place and has done so since at least 1975.
This leads me to another question that is key to understanding the current situation: why did
the followers of the Xinxing-gong decide to make Kōbō Daishi an integral part of their new temple?
Especially after the old Kōbō-ji burned down, there was plenty of opportunity to do away with any
and  all  elements  reminiscent  of  Shingon  Buddhism  in  the  new  1959  temple.  Yuedu  Taipei
Tianhougong devotes a few pages to Kōbō Daishi, mostly providing biographical information. It is
here that we also find a brief remark about a dream one of the xinzhong had in which Kōbō Daishi
appeared to him. This apparently happened around the time when the Kōbō-ji was refitted to serve
as the renewed Xinxing-gong. More informative in this regard is the front page of an issue of the
Kōyasan jihō 高野山時報 dated to October 11, 1975,9 in which Kondō Honshō 近藤本昇 (then one
9 第 2089号.
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Kōyasan's highest ranking priests) expresses his gratitude to the Taipei Tianhou-gong for preserving
artifacts from the former Kōbō-ji, including the statue of Kōbō Daishi undergoing ascetic training
(shūgyō daishi 修行大師) that today can still be found inside the Taipei Tianhou-gong's courtyard.
Kondō makes mention of a certain Huang Qing Yu 黃慶余 , identified as a manager of the Taipei
Tianhou-gong, who had a dream in which  Kōbō Daishi appeared to him – twice. This prompted
Huang to work for the preservation of the Kōbō-ji's artifacts. Not only did he work to preserve the
statues that were a part of the Kōbō-ji, but he also appears to have been involved in the restoration
of the damage the fire of 1953 had caused them. Looking at the contents of the rest of the issue of
the Kōyasan jihou, it becomes clear that a group of priests from Kōyasan had just returned from a
trip to Taiwan in order to hold a kaigen kuyō (see also section 4.2.) for the restored statue of Kōbō
Daishi.  Since  this  is  about  the  same  time  that  the  relationship  between  Japan  and  Taiwan
normalized, the priests appear to have been among the first wave of wansei 湾性 (Japanese born and
raised in Taiwan) who went back to visit their birth ground for the first time in thirty years. 
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6. The Present
This chapter begins with a survey of the many deities that can be found at the Taipei Tianhou-gong
today. Discussing the temple's Chinese deities in more detail puts me in a better position to consider
the role Kōbō Daishi plays at the site. His role is ambiguous, as many visitors do not know who he
is. In practice, Kōbō Daishi is more often than not assumed to be yet another Chinese deity that
needs to be respectfully greeted when one is doing baibai. The temple itself is putting effort into
making clear that Kōbō Daishi is a historical figure of importance to the history of the site and its
former Japanese occupants,  and should be respected as such. With the recent popularity of the
Shikoku  henro, the number of Taiwanese who do know about Kōbō Daishi and visit the Taipei
Tianhou-gong specifically for him are on the rise. In the last section of this chapter, I relate how
representatives of the Taiwanese henro community recently invited Japanese Shingon priests over to
Taiwan in order to have them perform a Buddhist service at the Taipei Tianhou-gong. 
6.1. A survey of the site's deities
If one enters the courtyard of the Taipei Tianhou-gong and goes to the right, one immediately runs
into statue number one and two of the former Taipei henro (see figure 3 on the next page; the statue
to  the  far  right  is  number one,  and the  statue to  the left  number  two).  We have learned from
Sankurō's account that these used to be located to the right of the entrance of the Kōbō-ji as well, so
nothing has changed in this regard. No information is provided to the visitors regarding the role or
function of these two statues (neither at the site itself, nor in the books or on the website), so only
the  informed  visitor  will  know  anything  about  them.  Statue  number  one  depicts  Shaka  (the
historical buddha); its caption reads 一番・アワ・灵山寺 ,10 or 'number one, Awa, Ryōzen-ji'. As
mentioned before, Awa was the former name of today's Tokushima prefecture. Statue number two
depicts Amida (the buddha who has his paradise, Gokuraku Jōdo, to the West); its caption reads 二
番・アワ・極楽寺, or 'number two, Awa, Gokuraku-ji'. 
The two statues of the former Taipei henro are today surrounded by eight other statues (see
figure 3). At least two of these depict Kōbō Daishi: one of him performing shūgyō 修行  (ascetic
training) while holding a small child (third from the right); another of him standing while holding a
vajra, or kongōsho 金剛杵 (in the middle, down). I take at least three others to be of the bodhisattva
Jizō 地蔵 (the three statues standing behind Kōbō Daishi holding a vajra). In Japanese religious art,
Jizō can be recognized by a set of formal features, which include wearing a priestly garb and a
necklace known in Japanese as a yōraku 瓔珞, while holding a shakujō 錫杖 (a staff with six rings,
10 The character 灵 is the simplified version of the character 霊.
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each representing one of the  rikidō 六道 , or six worlds, in which Jizō performs his salvational
activity) in the one hand and a wish-granting jewel in the other (Ten Grotenhuis, 1999: 148-149). A
sixth statue appears to depict Kannon (second from the right). The third statue from the left, down,
may represent the bodhisattva Kokūzō 虚空蔵, since he appears to hold the stem of a lotus flower
topped with a jewel in his right hand.  At present, I do not know who the final statue (second statue
from the left, down) depicts. 
Going up the stairs from here and to the right up another level leads one to the abode of the
Jade Emperor, Yuhuang Dadi  玉皇大帝 . The Jade Emperor is the only deity found at the Taipei
Tianhou-gong that is situated at a higher level, possibly to signify his high status within the imperial
bureaucracy. His aloof nature makes him somewhat difficult to approach – in fact, most of the
people who come to do baibai at the Taipei Tianhou-gong probably visit to make a request to one of
the lower deities. People come up the stairs with all incense sticks freshly lit, as the Jade Emperor is
the first deity of the temple's suggested  baibai course. People make a respectful obeisance to the
Emperor, before they turn around to the do the same to the sky – only then do they put one stick of
incense into the incense holder. 
For a long time, the prevalent perception of the Chinese pantheon of deities was that it
reflects the imperial bureaucratic apparatus. The Jade Emperor occupies the top position of a divine
managerial pyramid, and there is a hierarchy of gods that delegate tasks (such as the requests of
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Figure 3: Statues from the Japanese period.
worshipers) to one another. Power thus seems to be held by the top and is exercised on those below.
There is no denying that this particular way of imagining the world of the gods served the interest of
those in power. As we have seen in section 3.1., the imperial court at times needed to draw powerful
local deities into official ideology in order to be able to exercise a certain degree of control over
them. We have also seen that such deities exchanged efficacy based on ling with efficacy based on
rank, the latter of which could be altered by the living emperor. 
The perception that the Chinese pantheon of deities is a well-oiled bureaucratic machine was
challenged by Meir Shahar and Robert P. Weller in their 1996 book  Unruly Gods: Divinity and
Society  in  China.  They grant  the argument  that  the representation of the world of the gods as
bureaucratic served to promote the existing social order at the expense of another. However, power
was not the monopoly of those at the top. At the end of section 5.1., we have seen how politicians
have not only made use of the Mazu cult in order to achieve certain political goals, but that the
reverse has also been the case. It can be imagined that in imperial times as well, there were cults
that were inventive enough to make imperial power productive for their own purposes. The imperial
court thus managed to draw certain folk deities within a measure of official control, but always at a
price. That they did not manage to fully assimilate every deity in this way is apparent from the fact
that  most  deities have retained a non-bureaucratic  iconography.  The most  obvious example are
Buddhist deities. Shahar and Weller note that in the Xiyouji 西遊記  (translated as Journey to the
West), the Jade Emperor ultimately has to call on the Buddha to trap Sun Wu Kong 孫悟空, or the
Monkey King. This is a prominent case of a deity that transcends the power of the Jade Emperor
and has not been transformed into a bureaucrat in the latter's managerial system. 
Most of the Taipei Tianhou-gong's deities do not answer to the bureaucratic ideal. Going
back down the stairs and making a right corner leads one to the stove where paper offerings are
burned, and to the small room holding where one can find Dicang 地蔵  (see figure 4 on the next
page). His Japanese counterpart Jizō is often depicted as a wandering monk – the Dicang found in
Chinese temples is generally depicted as a king, in which case he is called Dicang Wang Pusa 地蔵
王菩薩. Besides the fact that the main image of Dicang of the Taipei Tianhou-gong wears a crown
and is decorated in gold, the attributes he holds are the same as his Japanese counterpart: a staff
with six rings and a wish-granting jewel. In Japan, since he is popularly believed to watch over
travelers, statues of Jizō can be found beside the road and at intersections everywhere. In Taiwan,
Dicang's role is primarily confined to saving the dead, and as such isolated from daily life. Zhiru Ng
writes that in Chinese monasteries, Dicang is frequently enshrined separately (that is to say, away
from the main hall) in a  gongde-yuan  功德院 ,  or merit cloister, which additionally houses the
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memorial tablets of the dead ancestors (2007: 3). This is the case at the Taipei Tianhou-gong as
well. The image of Dicang is here flanked by two memorial tablets, one for the ancestors of the
Xinxing-gong, and one for those of the Taipei Tianhou-gong.11 
Turning back and going to the right, one finds yet another small room, this time containing a
seated image of Kōbō Daishi holding a  vajra. Since he forms a special case, I will discuss him
separately in the next section. Entering into the main hall, one finds images of, from left to right,
Guansheng Dijun  關聖帝君  (or Guanyu  關羽 ), Tianshang Shengmu  天上聖母  (or Mazu), and
Guanshiyin Pusa 観世音菩薩 (or Guanyin). It is not uncommon for these three deities to share the
same ritual  space.  The exact  relationship  of  Guanyin to  Mazu is  difficult  to  determine,  and is
thought of differently by devotees. The conception of Mazu is commonly believed to have been
made possible by Guanyin. It is moreover said that Mazu studied Buddhist scriptures from an early
age and that she received her supernatural talents from Guanyin. There are also quite some believers
who unwittingly confuse Guanyin and Mazu, which is  no surprise at  all  since the two share a
similar iconography, namely that of a woman riding a cloud while saving people at sea (Tan, 2004:
18). 
The Mazu icon of the Taipei Tianhou-gong is dressed as an empress donning a crown of nine
11 The memorial tablets read 艋舺新興宮歷代功德先賢之神位 and 天后宮歷代功德先賢之神位, respectively. 
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Figure 4: Dicang.
strings of pearls (see figure 5). The number of strings represents the rank of the temple, and can
vary from seven to thirteen (Ibid.).  She is flanked by her two guardians, Qianliyan  千里眼  ('a
thousand li eyes') and Shunfeng'er 順風耳 ('favorable wind ears'); the former can spot seafarers in
need of help from a thousand li12 away, while the latter can hear cries for help as fast as the wind
(Ibid.: 16). It should be recalled here that Mazu used to be a goddess of the sea, but that she is now
considered to be all-powerful and thus capable of granting a wide variety of wishes. Even though
she is outranked by the Jade Emperor, we should, again, not assume that her power depends on
those  higher  than  her  in  the  imperial  bureaucratic  order.  Rather,  Mazu's  power  seems  operate
autonomously, sometimes making it seem as though the girl from Meizhou has usurped the throne.
She attracts far more worshipers than the Jade Emperor, and is probably considered by many a
devotee to be much more powerful than him. 
It is at the central altar in front of Mazu that most visitors of the temple clutter together. I
want  to  here  stress  once  more  that  visiting  a  temple  in  order  to  consult  a  deity  is  not  by the
Taiwanese themselves necessarily considered to be a form of religious behavior. Many simply flock
to Mazu temples in order to gain some peace of mind. Providing some psychological and spiritual
relief in times of need, Mazu has integrated into the daily life of many a Taiwanese person. It is not
uncommon to see people – young and old alike – share their problems with Mazu out loud. She is
thought of as able to assist with all of life's problems, whether it concerns passing an important
exam, professional success, or marriage. When approaching Mazu for help, people begin by stating
12 One li 里 equals half a kilometer. 
46
Figure 5: Mazu, with Qianliyan on the right and Shunfeng'er on the left.
their name and where they are from, and then share their wish, or discuss their problem. Mazu is not
only a passive listener, but also an active giver of advice. People can throw  jiaobei  杯筊  (moon
blocks) in order to divine Mazu's will, and draw qiuqian 求籤, bamboo sticks with a number written
on them. This number can be taken to one of the temple's fortune tellers, who then provide an
interpretation of the deity's will, often for free. 
On the way back down to the courtyard from the opposite side of the temple, one runs into a
small room for Fude Zhengshen福德正神, better know as Tudigong 土地公, or the lord of the earth.
He is considered a deity who watches over the local community, and is the most ubiquities of all
deities worshipped in Taiwan. Not only can he be found in almost any temple, but also in countless
smaller shrines scattered all over the cityscape. In contrast with deities such as Guanyin and Mazu,
he does have a well-defined role in the heavenly imperial hierarchy. Since he occupies the lowest
position, he is easily accessible; people believe that Tudigong will take one's wishes to the higher
gods. Tudigong is not an anonymous deity; in each community, there is a person who, while still
alive, did good deeds, and whose spirit has become the Tudigong of that locale (Hall, 2009: 97-98).
Tudigong is  often accompanied by a tiger,  Huye 虎爺 ;  at  the Taipei Tianhou-gong, incense is
offered to both at the same time. The altar of the tiger is generally located close to the ground.
According to Alessandro Dell'Orto, this animal is taken to represent Tudigong (2002: 207). 
Finally, on the way back to the entrance, one passes by a statue of Kōbō Daishi. This is the
bronze statue of  shūgyō daishi that was mentioned by Kondō in the  Kōyasan jihō. Now that we
have mapped the Taipei Tianhou-gong's Chinese deities – which pose no problem to the average
Taiwanese visitor as they are thoroughly familiar with them –, it is time to turn to  Kōbō Daishi,
whose role is much more complicated.
6.2. Two images of Kōbō Daishi
What makes the case of Kōbō Daishi at the Taipei Tianhou-gong so interesting is that he is an
integral part  of the temple's  baibai course. In  Yuedu Taipei Tianhou-gong,  the suggested  baibai
course is the following: 1) the Jade Emperor, 2) Mazu, 3) Guanyin, 4) Guanyu, 5) Dicang, 6)  Kōbō
Daishi (sitting, holding a vajra), 7) Tudigong, 8) Huye, 9) Kōbō Daishi (shūgyō daishi), 10) the ten
Japanese statues to the right of the entrance.13 Today, for reasons unknown to me, the suggested
course has changed to: 1) the Jade Emperor, 2) Mazu, 3) Guanyin, 4) Guanyu, 5) Kōbō Daishi
(sitting, holding a vajra) and Dicang, 6) Tudigong and Huye. The statue of shūgyō daishi is now no
longer part of the baibai course, and, similar to Tudigong and Huye, one stick of incense is offered
to both  Kōbō Daishi and Dicang. 
13 The last are erroneously labeled 菩薩石像 in the book, but not all statues are of bodhisattva's. 
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The average visitor of the Taipei Tianhou-gong is unlikely to know anything about Kōbō
Daishi. Perhaps for this reason, a plaque hangs on the wall next the room containing the image of
the sitting Kōbō Daishi holding a  vajra.  It  contains some biographical information,  and briefly
explains why he is enshrined at the Taipei Tianhou-gong. What makes Kōbō Daishi different from
the other deities making up the baibai course is that he is not presented as a shen (god). He is meant
to be treated as a historical figure. The fifth stick of incense goes into a holder that is not in front of
Kōbō Daishi, but Dicang. There are also no tools for divination (moon blocks) in Kōbō Daishi's
immediate  vicinity.  That  he  is  simply  a  historical  figure  was  stressed  as  well  by  the  temple
management in my correspondence with them.  From their perspective, Kōbō Daishi is a famous
monk who people pay respect and look up to rather than worship as a god. 
That is not to say that Kōbō Daishi is nothing more than a historical figure to all who visit,
and this is precisely because visitors do not know about him in the first place. One can attempt to
educate the xinzhong, but observing them going past Kōbō Daishi makes it clear that only few read
the  informational  plaque.  The  line  between  shen and  historical  figure  additionally  is  nearly
impossible  to  draw –  consider  the  fact  that  nearly all  of  the  sites'  deities  at  some point  were
historical figures. When I explained the practice of baibai in section 2.2., I wrote that most people
visit a temple to consult one particular deity. The rest are offered incense to as well, but mostly out
of respect. To many visitors, Kōbō Daishi is yet another deity that needs to be greeted in order to
perform baibai in a respectful manner. Other visitors are confused about the setup in which Dicang
and Kōbō Daishi share an incense holder; I have observed many skip Kōbō Daishi altogether in
order to go straight to Dicang, who is familiar to anyone. Those who do take their time to pay their
respects to Kōbō Daishi keep it brief, as they would when going up to the Jade Emperor. This in
contrast to Mazu, the temple's main deity, in front of who some people spend as much as an hour in
order to tell their story. 
The above applies mostly to tourists – and since it the Taipei Tianhou-gong is situated in the
popular district of Ximen-ding, it draws many. There are also those who know something about
Kōbō Daishi, and they treat him differently. I think we can roughly divide this group of people into
three kinds. The first group consists of frequent visitors to the Taipei Tianhou-gong. Those who live
in the neighborhood and come by often to, for example, receive alms, may know about its history
and treat Kōbō Daishi as a historical figure, looking up to him as an exemplary person. The second
group consists  of  enthusiasts  of  the  Shikoku  henro.  Over  the course of  their  henro,  they have
undoubtedly experienced first-hand the way in which the Shikoku regard Kōbō Daishi. Moreover,
they are likely to themselves have developed a relationship to Kōbō Daishi. Let me take up in this
group in more detail in the next section. The third group of people is composed of people who take
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Kōbō Daishi to be representative of Japanese culture. Since Ximen-ding used to be the Asakusa of
Taihoku, some Taiwanese living there may have had a father or mother who grew up among the
Japanese and their customs. One should also not forget that between 1937 and 1945, there were
Taiwanese  families  who were  fully  Japanized  as  a  part  of  the  kōminka-movement.  The Taipei
Tianhou-gong is one of few places left in all of Taiwan where there is a continuity with the colonial
past – a past that has been idealized by some. 
6.3. The Taipei Tianhou-gong and the Shikoku henro
The Kōbō-ji used to be the starting point of the Taipei henro, and was presumably also its ending
point. The Taipei Tianhou-gong is slowly but surely reprising the Kōbō-ji's former role. Although
the Taipei henro is no longer in existence, Taiwanese have, in recent years, discovered the Shikoku
henro. The popularity of the henro with the Taiwanese is part of a global trend in which an ever-
growing amount of aspiring non-Japanese pilgrims travel to Shikoku in order to walk (a part of) the
pilgrimage. Linked to the popularity of the  henro is the rediscovery of their own heritage by the
Taiwanese. The Taipei Tianhou-gong is now also frequented by Taiwanese henro who yet have to
depart for, or have already returned from, Shikoku. Among the Taiwanese henro that visit the Taipei
Tianhou-gong, there are also a fair share of sufferers from Shikokubyō, or the irresistible urge to
return to the island to walk its pilgrimage circuit one more time. 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that Japanese Shingon Buddhist priests have been
going to the Taipei Tianhou-gong to hold ceremonies since at least 1975, and possibly a few years
earlier. Their visit became standardized, and the temple now expects a group of priests from either
Kōyasan's Kongōbu-ji or Tōkyō Betsuin 東京別院 to perform a ceremony in honor of Kōbō Daishi
somewhere between October and December every year. Their yearly return is described in Yuedu
Taipei Tianhou-gong as a  chaosheng,  or pilgrimage. From the point of view of a folk religious
temple such as the Taipei Tianhou-gong, it can be imagined that the management must have been
relieved to host the Japanese priests. Kōbō Daishi appeared in the dream of one of the managers,
after all. Considered from the Taiwanese perspective, I assume that the reason why they enshrined
Kōbō Daishi at the Taipei Tianhou-gong partly had to do with appeasing his spirit. Especially when
the freshly appropriated Kōbō-ji burned down in 1953, many must have thought that the disaster
was no coincidence. Having Japanese priests come over to perform a Buddhist ceremony might
have been considered a good way to keep the deities originally enshrined at the site at peace. 
On November 21,  2016,  a  group of priests  not  related to  Kongōbu-ji  or  Tōkyō Betsuin
performed a Buddhist service at the Taipei Tianhou-gong at the invitation of representatives of the
Taiwanese  henro community.  They originated  from Shikoku  itself,  namely  temple  twenty-two,
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Byōdō-ji 平等寺, and temple seventy-nine, Tennō-ji 天皇寺. That the henro community of Taiwan
was able to organize the event shows not only their growing influence, but also that one of the
original functions of the Kōbō-ji – as the starting and ending point of the  henro – is slowly but
surely being restored. The management of the Taipei Tianhou-gong has shown itself willing to host
such events, and cater to a new set of spiritual needs. 
One of the people forming the driving force behind the Taiwanese henro community is the
author of the 2013 book bianlu: 1200 gongli Siguo tubu ji 遍路：1200公里四國徒步記,14 Odili Lee.
She  walked  the  complete  Shikoku  henro in  2009.  At  the  time,  Lee  could  not  find  complete
information in Chinese on the Shikoku henro, so she decided to record her experience and publish a
book in order to enable more Taiwanese to make the trip. The book became a success, and the
Taiwanese henro community is now thriving. It has organized itself primarily on Facebook – Lee
runs a community page called Siguo bianlu tonghaohui 四國遍路同好會15 that has 7,343 followers
as of May 22, 2017. There is also a Facebook group dedicated to exchanging information on the
Shikoku henro called Siguo bianlu fenxiangchu 四國遍路分享處16 and that as of the same date has
1,339 members. The pages are used to spread announcements on events such as the ceremony held
at the Taipei Tianhou-gong. 
Lee was involved in the organization of the Buddhist service at the Taipei Tianhou-gong.
According to her, the original reason for the group of Japanese Shingon priests to visit Taiwan was
in order to perform a goma 護摩 (fire ritual) at the Qingxiu-yuan in Hualien (mentioned in section
2.2.),  which  celebrated  its  centennial  on  November  18,  2016.  After  some  deliberation,  it  was
decided that holding a service at the Taipei Tianhou-gong on the 21st of the same month would also
be among the possibilities. Permission would still have to be obtained, however, from the temple's
management, which initially responded by stating the group should get permission from Kōyasan.
As going through the required paperwork would take too much time, a new request was submitted,
this  time in the name of the  Shikoku Hachijūhakkasho  Reijōkai 四国八十八ヶ所霊場会 ,  the
organization  that  oversees  the  pilgrimage  route.  The  latter  request  succeeded.  This  way,  the
Buddhist service was organized autonomously from Kōyasan; the group of priests invited by the
Taiwanese  henro community thus has no direct relation to the group of priests who pay a yearly
visit to the temple in the autumn months. 
The service held at the Taipei Tianhou-gong was promoted as a mieiku 御影供. We already
encountered this kind of ceremony in the earlier chapters; the purpose of a  mieiku  is to make an
14 Authored under the pen name Xiao Ou 小歐.
15 https://www.facebook.com/gohenro/
16 https://www.facebook.com/groups/88shikokuhenro/
50
offering to Kōbō Daishi, and these are normally held in Japan on the 21st of the third month every
year, or the day of Kōbō Daishi's nyūjō. Some temples hold such services on the 21st of every month
– in which case they are referred to as tsukinami mieiku 月並御影供. Since the mieiku at the Taipei
Tianhou-gong was not held on the 21st of March but on the 21st of November, it may be better to
refer to it as a tsukinami mieiku. The service was led by the fukujūshoku 副住職 of temple twenty-
two of the Shikoku  henro. In order to be able to hold the service, an image of Kōbō Daishi was
temporarily placed on the central altar, right in front of the temple's Mazu icon (see figure 6). The
service was open to the public – I estimate the number of henro-related attendants, including those
participating in the service, to have been at around fifty people. 
Since the temple was open to the public during the service, regular visitors were also able to
witness the proceedings of the Buddhist service. Many, of course, did not know what they were
watching, nor realized the uniqueness of the situation. Those present from the henro community did
explain to interested onlookers what was going on. For the most part, however, people who came to
consult  Mazu  went  about  their  business  as  if  it  was  any other  ordinary  day.  This  lead  to  the
remarkable juxtaposition of traditions that I would typify as a parallelism of discourses. While the
Japanese Buddhist priests were chanting their sutra's, the sound of moonblocks being thrown on the
floor  could  constantly  be  heard.  During  the  hour  the  service  lasted,  the  various  layers  I  have
discussed in the previous chapters interpenetrated to bring to the surface the glimpse of a fourth
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Figure 6: The tsukinami mieiku at the Taipei Tianhou-gong.
layer that I take to currently be under formation. Whether this layer will continue to develop itself in
the nearby future depends on the extent of the cooperation between the management of the temple
and Taiwan's henro community. 
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7. Conclusion
The main aim of this thesis was to, first, untangle and specify the two discourses that, in the past,
have informed the Taipei Tianhou-gong in turn, and second, show how these discourses today do so
simultaneously.  In  order  to  reach this  aim,  I  applied  the  place-based approach to  the  study of
pilgrimage. I analyzed the site in terms of historical layers that presently interlock to produce the
condition of possibility for the revival of the Kōbō-ji's original function. The Taipei Tianhou-gong
has thus become a place that is not only important to those of the Mazu cult, but also to those of the
Taiwanese henro community, the latter of which attach special importance to Kōbō Daishi. 
The chapter on methodology first considered past approaches to the study of pilgrimage. I
here concluded that the Turnerian approach to pilgrimage implies a universality that is blind to the
particularities of pilgrimage across cultures. Although Eade and Sallnow's model manages to make
up for this deficiency, their focus on the contested character of pilgrimage sites does not take into
account that any given site can also be characterized by an apparent harmony of discourses. The
Taipei Tianhou-gong forms one such example. I proposed the place-based approach as a way of
remedying the theoretical shortcomings of the contestation model, since the former assumes that
pilgrimage sites can accommodate multiple meanings. We have seen in the concrete case of the
Taipei  Tianhou-gong  that  its  management  currently  allows  the  practice  of  Shingon  Buddhist
services on its temple grounds, which means they do not insist that the site be informed solely by
the beliefs and rituals of the Mazu cult. The two discourses identified in this thesis, respectively a
Shingon Buddhist and a Chinese folk religious one, can therefore be said to harmoniously coincide
at the Taipei Tianhou-gong.
The second part of the chapter on methodology considered the problem with the uncritical
application of two terms to East Asian cultural phenomena, namely 'pilgrimage' and 'religion'. I
have shown that the term 'pilgrimage' cannot be applied to Japanese and Taiwanese forms of sacred
travel,  as  the  term is  laden  with  connotations  specific  to  its  Western  experience.  In  order  to
adequately discuss the East Asian experience of sacred travel, I introduced and resorted to words
from the Japanese and Chinese languages.  In the case of religion,  I argued that we should not
uncritically assume the term to be a neutral analytical category. In fact, if we investigate its use
since its transmission to Japan, we see how the term has become normatively charged. This lead to
the birth of a specifically arranged religious landscape of desirable and undesirable practices.  I
moreover argued that we should not assume Taiwanese and Japanese people to subscribe to a single
religious creed at the expense of another. Rather, their worldviews are essentially combinatory. This
is reflected at the Taipei Tianhou-gong, where multiple traditions seamlessly coincide. 
In chapter three, I took up the analysis of the first historical layer: the development of the
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Mazu cult during the Ming and Qing dynasties. I paid attention in particular to the Xinxing-gong
and the way in which this temple has narratively been construed by the Taipei Tianhou-gong as its
spiritual predecessor. I showed how temples in Taiwan are locked in battles for legitimacy. Positing
the  Xinxing-gong as  a  spiritual  predecessor  is  necessary in  order  to  make clear  to  prospective
visitors that the Taipei Tianhou-gong's Mazu icon is both old and of distant origin. 
The analysis of the second historical layer in chapter four took us into the Japanese period. I
here showed that the Japanese initially adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards Taiwanese religious
practices.  This changed, however,  when revolts against Japanese rule were connected to certain
religious groups. Moreover, with the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese war in 1937, it became
necessary  to  rapidly  assimilate  the  Taiwanese  into  Japanese  culture.  Colonial  religious  policy
became more repressive as time went on. Against this background, I sketched the dissemination of
Shingon Buddhism in Taiwan, focusing on a few specific sites in the immediate vicinity of Taipei.
The Kōbō-ji was built in 1910 in order to offer spiritual services to the ever-increasing amount of
Japanese inhabitants in Taiwan. The temple focused on charity and social work, as well. It moreover
formed the point of departure for the Taipei henro, a copy in Taiwan of the Shikoku pilgrimage. In
order to show how this particular  henro was experienced by Japanese inhabitants of the island, I
related the account of Sankurō. I argued that his account is not different from the way in which a
Japanese person today experiences the Shikoku  henro.  Such experience is  informed by cultural
patterns – in the Japanese case the expectation to be able to collect kudoku at heterotopia such as
temples. 
In  chapter  five,  I  showed how the third historical  layer  heralded when the  Kōbō-ji  was
handed over to the followers of the Xinxing-gong, who saw their original temple destroyed in 1943
as  a  part  of  Japanese  war  efforts.  I  considered  the  religious  policies  of  the  Kuomintang-led
government,  and  showed  how increasing  democratization  lead  to  the  abandonment  of  policies
meant  to  encourage  Chinese  identity.  Against  the  background  of  the  tumultuous  change  in
governments in the post-war period, I discussed the controversy surrounding the Taipei Tianhou-
gong and the way in which the handover to the followers of the Xinxing-gong proceeded. In the
end, the Zhongguo fojiaohui was not able to prevent the change in management from a Buddhist to
a folk religious one. When the wooden structures of the original Kōbō-ji burned down in 1953, a
new temple was built in its stead. This temple, finished in 1959, is the Taipei Tianhou-gong as it
stands today. Although the site was primarily informed by the Mazu cult for decades, from 1975
onward, Shingon Buddhist  priests  begin frequenting the site  on a yearly basis  in order to  hold
Buddhist services. It is here that we already begin to catch a glimpse of the formation of the fourth
layer. 
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